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A Wall Between a Secular Government
and a Religious People
John A. Ragosta*
INTRODUCTION

The “wall of separation” between church and state, a phrase
popularized by Thomas Jefferson and unanimously embraced by
the Supreme Court in its first religious freedom case, is a useful
metaphor to describe how, under the Constitution’s proscription of
religious establishments and protection of the free exercise of
religion, government must not interfere with the church and the
church (institutionally) must not interfere with government.1

* Historian at the Robert H. Smith International Center for Jefferson
Studies at Monticello. The author would like to thank Carl Bogus and the
entire staff of Roger Williams University School of Law and the Roger Williams
University Law Review for their excellent work on the conference (especially
under the trying circumstances of conducting it virtually) and in preparing this
important issue of the Law Review. I would also like to thank the Freedom
from Religion Foundation and Andrew Seidel for their support of this conference. The views expressed herein are the author’s own and do not reflect the
views of the Thomas Jefferson Foundation nor Virginia Humanities. Of course,
any errors are the author’s own.
1. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878). Others used
the metaphor of a wall of separation before Jefferson. For example, James
Burgh, in “Political Disquisitions,” writes of the danger of the church as an
engine of state and in “Crito” urges the building of an “impenetrable wall of
separation between things sacred and civil . . . . The less the church and the
state had to do with one another, it would be better for both.” STEVEN K.
GREEN, INVENTING A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE MYTH OF THE RELIGIOUS
FOUNDING 54 (2015) (quoting BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 35 (1968)). Roger Williams said much the same, for example referring to the “hedge or wall of Separation between the Garden of the
Church and the Wilderness of the world.” 1 ROGER WILLIAMS, Mr. Cotton’s
Letter Examined and Answered, in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER
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“Jefferson’s metaphor in describing the relation between Church
and State speaks of a ‘wall of separation,’ not of a fine line easily
overstepped.”2 Admittedly, James Madison on occasion spoke of a
“line of separation,” but he meant the same thing.3
Most Americans agree that the metaphor properly describes
the appropriate constitutional relationship—sixty-three percent of
Americans want “churches to stay out of politics.”4 While the wall
metaphor does not, itself, resolve all of the relevant conflicts and its
application to particular cases may be complex, Justice Jackson’s
backhanded reference to the “serpentine walls” at Jefferson’s
WILLIAMS 315, 392 (Perry Miller ed., 1963). (It is worth noting that the Founders, lacking the ability to “Google” in robust databases, do not appear to have
relied on Williams’ writings in their early debates on religious freedom and
adoption of the First Amendment). Jefferson’s use of the phrase in his January
1, 1802, letter to the Danbury Baptists declaring that the First Amendment
had erected a “wall of separation between Church [and] State,” Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-36-02-0152-0006
[perma.cc/8K3A-FPXB] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) [hereinafter Letter to the
Danbury Baptists], undoubtedly popularized the image, and the phrase is commonly associated with Jefferson, see, e.g., JOHN RAGOSTA, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
JEFFERSON’S LEGACY, AMERICA’S CREED 140–41, 256 n.12 (2013).
2. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948).
3. See Letter from James Madison to Jasper Adams (Sept. 1833), NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/99-02-02-2830
[perma.cc/7KYX-P863] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). A few academics have tried
to make a substantive point out of Jefferson’s use of the “wall” metaphor while
Madison referred to a “line,” arguing that Madison was less committed to a
strict separation. See, e.g., Daniel L. Dreisbach, Introduction to JASPER ADAMS,
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: JASPER ADAMS AND THE CHURCH
STATE DEBATE 1, 21 (Daniel L. Dreisbach, ed., 1996); Sydney E. Mead, Neither
Church nor State: Reflections on James Madison’s ‘Line of Separation,’ 10 J. OF
CHURCH AND STATE 349, 350 (1968). This is to grasp at straws and is inconsistent with Madison’s views on church-state relations. That Madison, the consummate wordsmith and draftsman, used the two-dimensional analogy of a
line while Jefferson, an architect and gardener, used the three-dimensional
analogy of a wall, is simply not substantively significant.
4. Americans have Positive Views about Religion’s Role in Society, but
Want It Out of Politics, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/2019/11/15/americans-have-positive-views-about-religions-role-insociety-but-want-it-out-of-politics/ [perma.cc/AS9G-XAW6]. Of course, there
are those who reject the metaphor, noting accurately that the phrase was not
itself included in the Constitution, while inaccurately dismissing the influence
of Jefferson and the idea of separation. See, e.g., DAVID BARTON, THE
JEFFERSON LIES (2012); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91–99 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing adherence to Jefferson’s “wall” metaphor).
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University of Virginia is unkind and tends to unfairly minimize the
significance of the metaphor.5 The simile is pedagogically powerful,
and this type of broadly-embraced and easily-understood public
metaphor helps to embed the principle in the minds of the people.
In a similar vein, Madison recognized that an important function of
a bill of rights is that “political truths declared in that solemn
manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims
of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the
national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and
passion.”6 The powerful ability of a clever simile to explain and to
be embraced by the people has certainly been the history of the
“wall of separation.”
The prominence of Jefferson’s turn of a phrase, though, begs
the question: Why do we care so much what Jefferson and Madison
thought about religious freedom? In fact, a group of historians and
judges, most notably with the encouragement of Justice Rehnquist
in Wallace v. Jaffree, have sought to minimize the importance of
their views.7 After all, critics ask, should we not be equally
interested in the view of other Founders or those who ratified the
Constitution, the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment?8 Alexander Hamilton has suddenly become popular,
for example, and he sponsored a “Christian Constitution Society.”9
Make no mistake, these attacks on the Jeffersonian influence
herald an attempt to breach that wall of separation.
I have addressed this topic in detail elsewhere.10 Suffice it to
say that not only did Jefferson and Madison provide the intellectual
and political foundation for the adoption of the Virginia Statute for
Establishing Religious Freedom, but that statute became central to

5. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237–38 (1948) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
6. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-14-02-0018
[https://perma.cc/LT5Z-4HTL] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
7. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 98–99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Patrick F. Brown, Wallace v. Jaffree and the Need to Reform
Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 573, 586 (1986).
9. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James A. Bayard (Apr. [16-21]
1802), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/0125-02-0321 [https://perma.cc/9XX8-MMQ3] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
10. See generally RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 209-22.
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the development of the First Amendment (with Madison again
playing the key role in drafting and adoption).11 Their efforts were
warmly embraced and supported politically by eighteenth-century
evangelicals who also demanded a strict separation of church and
state.12 After the First Amendment was adopted, as state after
state moved to eliminate vestiges of religious establishments and
ensure religious freedom, they did so based on the
Jeffersonian/Madisonian vision, often quoting them in the
process.13 As Americans grappled with the meaning of religious
freedom and church-state relations at the end of the eighteenth and
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they turned again
and again to Jefferson and Madison; their views and statements
repeated so often as to be the equivalent of “viral.”14 No other
politician, commentator, academic, or judge came close. As
textbooks were written they gave Jefferson and Madison credit for
the development of the critical elements of American religious
freedom.
Pamphlets encouraging emigration proclaimed the
strength of religious freedom in America by quoting Jefferson’s
Virginia Statute.15 It was no surprise, nor an anomaly, then, that
when the Supreme Court first turned to the question of the
meaning of religious freedom, it unanimously found that Jefferson’s
and Madison’s views, in particular the Virginia Statute, the letter
to the Danbury Baptists, and Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, “defined” American
11. See generally The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom: The Road to
the First Amendment, BILL OF RIGHTS IN ACTION, Fall 2010, at 1,
https://www.crf-usa.org/images/pdf/bria26_1_virginia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
D7KZ-ZF5Q].
12. JOHN A. RAGOSTA, WELLSPRING OF LIBERTY 125–36 (2010); John
Ragosta, Christian or Satanist displays? Keep them off gov’t land, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/contributors/2014/12/17/satanic-display-capitol-lansing/20563581/
[https://perma.cc/M8L6-V4TA] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
13. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 134–37. Christine Leigh Heyrman, The Separation of Church and State from the American Revolution to the Early Republic, NAT’L HUMANITIES CTR., http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/eighteen/ekeyinfo/sepchust.htm [perma.cc/Z72J-MDP3] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
14. See John Ragosta, Thomas Jefferson and Religious Freedom, THOMAS
JEFFERSON FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.monticello.org/site/researchand-collections/thomas-jefferson-and-religious-freedom [perma.cc/AP4Y-SL
B3].
15. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 142.
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religious freedom and the meaning of the First Amendment.16
While many states only slowly implemented a Jeffersonian
separation, as Steven Green shows, the Jeffersonian principle was
broadly supported and criticized.17
As many historians and lawyers have noted, to ask what the
“Founders thought” about this or most issues, as if the Founders
had one perspective or point of view, may often be relatively
fruitless.18 It is, however, often very relevant to ask whether there
are particular Founders whose views on a particular issue were
(and are) broadly embraced and especially important to understand
historical developments. This is such a case.
Still, Jefferson’s call for a “wall of separation” is only the turn
of a phrase, and there are a host of questions that the metaphor
does not immediately answer: While there may well be an
institutional separation, what happens on both sides of the wall visà-vis religion? Or, in more picturesque terms, if you were sitting on
the wall looking from side-to-side for religion, what would you see?
Is one side of the wall devoid of actors who are motivated by
religion? Or, worse, bereft of morality (a rather ridiculous but
politically potent claim made by some opponents of a Jeffersonian
separation)?19 And, even on the private side of the wall, has the
public square somehow been purged of religious actors or activities
(another ridiculous canard of which Jefferson was accused)?20

16. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–64 (1878).
17. See generally STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT:
CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2010).
Kent
Greenawalt earlier suggested that evidence that people read the First Amendment in a Jeffersonian/Madisonian voice at the time of its adoption, or by the
time that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted (making the provisions applicable to the states) would be persuasive, but he was unaware of such evidence. See Kent Greenwalt, Some Reflections on Fundamental Questions about
the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, in NO
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 341, 345–47 (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr., eds., 2012).
18. See, e.g., Derek H. Davis, Thomas Jefferson and the “Wall of Separation Metaphor,” 45 J. OF CHURCH AND STATE 5, 7–8, 14 (2003); Is this a Christian
Nation?, https://www.au.org/resources/publications/is-america-a-christian-nation [https://perma.cc/JTJ9-3F3U] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
19. E.g., Noah Feldman, A Church-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES (July 3,
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/magazine/a-churchstate-solution.html [https://perma.cc/MS6D-9DCR].
20. Davis, supra note 18, at 6, 8.
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I began thinking about this essay as I was working with new
guides at Monticello who will be faced with visitors’ questions
concerning Jefferson and religion and religious freedom. I am told
that these questions are the most asked at Monticello. (This is true
in part because the issue of slavery, including Sally Hemings, is
addressed proactively.) One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly
a growing unease in a large segment of the population that
somehow something has gone “wrong” with religion or religious
freedom in America and much of that unease seems to be vaguely
related to Jefferson’s wall of separation.
The cause of this unease apparently starts with shifts in
demographics. Others have noted the important demographic
aspect of the “Christian nation” debate.21 What is a “Christian
nation”? Is this merely a demographic descriptor about the
population, or does the moniker come with certain legal or policy
restrictions? For that matter, if this is a “Christian nation,” should
that include certain obligations on the part of the nation?22 And if,
at least initially, a demographic descriptor, what is the impact of
change in America’s religious demographic?
These are not new questions. In the 1840s, William Swan
Plumer, a well-known Presbyterian minister, addressed the
question of whether the United States was a “Christian
Commonwealth.” His response continues to speak powerfully
today:
21. Is this a Christian Nation?, supra note 18, at 1.
22. Many of those urging that the United States is a “Christian nation”
avoid the issue of whether that moniker comes with certain obligations, for
example to the poor, the sick, immigrants, etc. In George Washington’s Farewell Address, when he urged support for virtue, morality, and religion (discussed further below), he adds: “[i]t will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and,
at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and
too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.” George Washington, Farewell Address 22 (Sept. 19, 1796), U.S. Gov’t
Printing
Office,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CDOC106sdoc21/pdf/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc21.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/VA6Y-UVL2] [hereinafter Washington’s Farewell Address].
Jefferson suggested a similar moral component to U.S. immigration policy.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Jan. 24, 1807), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-4939
[https://perma.cc/VX5H-9TS6] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021); see also JOHN
LELAND, THE VIRGINIA CHRONICLE (1790), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE
LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 92, 118 (L.F. Greene ed., 1845) (“If Christian nations,
were nations of Christians these things would not be so.”).
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If by these terms be meant, that the great majority of our
people, who profess any religion, profess the [C]hristian
religion, . . . then I do not object to such language. But if it
be intended to create a belief that [C]hristians are or ought
to be by our laws entitled to any civil, political[,] or religious
privileges except in common with Jews, Deists and
Atheists, if there by any amongst us, then I utterly reject
it.23
Plumer’s comments imply several important aspects of the
demographic debate: First, the question becomes increasingly
complicated as the panoply of religions embraced by Americans
expands both within and beyond Christianity, something that has
certainly happened and that was, by more visionary early
Americans, anticipated. For example, in 1821, Thomas Jefferson
famously insisted that religious freedom was intended to cover
“within the mantle of it’s [sic] protection, the Jew and the Gentile,
the Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo [sic], and infidel of every
denomination.”24 Of course, there were not a lot of Hindus or
Muslims in eighteenth-century Virginia (setting aside the enslaved
community, many of whom embraced Islam, but it was not to them
that Jefferson was likely referring).25 Yet Jefferson recognized that
these people would be Americans and share in American religious
freedom. Today, their presence, and the presence of citizens from
literally dozens of different religions, certainly complicates even the
most basic assertion that the United States is a “Christian
Nation.”26
23. WILLIAM S. PLUMER, THE SUBSTANCE OF AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE
INDISCRIMINATE INCORPORATION OF CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES 11–12
(1847).
24. Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, 6 Jan.–29 July 1821 (Jan. 6, 1821),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-021756 [https://perma.cc/3T88-C2RC] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
25. See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Antebellum Islam, 58 HOWARD L.J.
141 (2014).
26. Jefferson’s comments were echoed by nineteenth century Virginia jurists in discussing the import of his Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom:
Declaring to the Christian and the Mahometan, the Jew and the Gentile, the Epicurean and the Platonists (if any such there be amongst
us,) that so long as they keep within [the law’s] pale, all are equally
objects of its protection; securing safety to the people, safety to the
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The issue becomes even further muddied if and when a
majority of Americans cease to affiliate themselves with
Christianity. The current trend is moving strongly in that
direction. By the mid-2010s, for the first time as a nation, white
Christians constituted less than half of the U.S. population, while
as recently as 1976, that figure was over eighty percent.27 In
twenty states, no single religious group accounts for a higher share
of the population than the religiously unaffiliated.28
These demographic shifts¾both the presence of so many
religions that appear to the majority to be “different,” “new,” and
“foreign” and the decline in Christianity as a share of the
population¾seem to instill doubt, fear in some people, about the
direction of the nation, the role of religion in the nation, and,
perhaps, their own religion. With those fears and doubts, many
cling with increased fervor to the hope of identifying a mythical
“Christian nation” and then, unfortunately, imposing it upon
others.
The unease that so many seem to feel in this regard, and the
necessity of expressing that unease at Monticello and in the context
of Jefferson’s “wall of separation,” relates to a pervasive, if
simplistic and misguided, belief that a wall of separation is
somehow “anti-religion” and that Jefferson so intended. This view
has been promoted for political reasons for literally centuries.
government, safety to religion; and (leaving reason free to combat error) securing purity of faith and practice far more effectively than by
clothing ministers of religion with exclusive temporal privileges; and
exposing them to the corrupting influence of wealth and power.
Perry v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. (3 Gratt.) 602, 612 (Va. 1846). Both those who
supported and opposed a separation of church and state recognized this fact.
For example, Alexander McLeod, a nineteenth century Reformed Presbyterian
minister, preaching against a separation of church and state bemoaned that
“[t]he US government gave as much support to ‘the Mahometan and the atheist’ as it did to the religion of Jesus.” JOSEPH S. MOORE, FOUNDING SINS: HOW
A GROUP OF ANTISLAVERY RADICALS FOUGHT TO PUT CHRIST INTO THE
CONSTITUTION 66 (2016) (quoting ALEXANDER MCLEOD, MESSIAH, GOVERNOR OF
THE NATIONS OF THE EARTH: A DISCOURSE 44–45 (1804)); see also RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 155–67 (discussing viewpoints on non-preference of the Christian
religion in America from the founding era to the late nineteenth century).
27. ROBERT P. JONES & DANIEL COX, AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS
IDENTITY: FINDINGS FROM THE 2016 AMERICAN VALUES ATLAS 7 (2017),
https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/PRRI-Religion-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W9FK-7KFB].
28. Id. at 7–8.
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During the explosive election of 1800, Jefferson’s opponents listed
a host of dangers to religion were Jefferson elected: Bibles would be
seized, churches degraded, women attacked, etc.29 One opponent
asked if there could be any doubt that if Jefferson was elected the
“morals which protect our lives from the knife of the assassin—
which guard the chastity of our wives and daughters from seduction
and violence—defend our property from plunder and devastation,
and shield our religion from contempt and profanation, will not be
trampled upon and exploded.”30 Jefferson’s supporters sought to
counter the canard, arguing that politics had “converted the elegant
reasoning of Jefferson against religious establishments, into a
blasphemous argument against religion itself.”31 In the midst of
the election of 1804, another supporter explained that the claim by
Jefferson’s political opponents that “religion is in danger” is made
“because Mr. Jefferson, in his political capacity lets it alone, lets it
have its own free course, is not inclined to interpose with his power
in favor of any sect, but is a friend to free, complete and perfect
toleration.”32 But these efforts to explain Jefferson’s position never
quite stamped out the easily-made and politically-convenient
attacks.33
The fear¾or at least the political usefulness of the
canard¾persists. It is as if the lies told about Jefferson’s religion
in the election of 1800¾his alleged atheism, his intent to seize and
burn Bibles, to sell the daughters of America into prostitution, to
destroy any morality or ethics in government, etc.¾still live. The
impression seems to be that Jefferson’s wall of separation is an
attack on public religion, that religion should be shorn from the
29. John A. Ragosta, Jefferson, Madison, and Adams: Conversations on
Religious Liberty, in RIVAL VISIONS: HOW JEFFERSON AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES
DEFINED THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 163, 170-71 (Dustin Gish & Andrew
Bibby eds., 2021); see Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Jefferson and the Election of 1800:
A Case Study in the Political Smear, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 467, 472–75 (1948).
30. NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE UNITED STATES IN 1800: HENRY ADAMS
REVISITED 48 (1988) (quoting A SHORT ADDRESS TO THE VOTERS OF DELAWARE
(Sept. 21, 1800)).
31. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 34 (quoting A Voter, MD. GAZETTE, Aug. 28,
1800).
32. Id. at 34, 241 n.58 (quoting PORTLAND E. ARGUS, Nov. 16, 1804).
33. Lerche, supra note 29, at 472; see Ragosta, supra note 29, at 169–74.
These are just a few of the many attacks on Jefferson. See generally RAGOSTA,
supra note 1, at 19–39.
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public square (in this context meaning both private and
government activity in public). The fact that separation is only a
policy against government religion or churches’ (institutional)
interference in government is ignored.34
Certainly, Jefferson never believed or advocated that religion
should be shorn from the public square, so long as the religion was
entirely voluntary and private¾neither embraced, compelled, nor
encouraged or discouraged by government.35 In fact, he fought the
impression even in his own time. When the state funding for his
beloved University of Virginia was threatened because of his (and
the institution’s) alleged infidelity and opposition to “a public
establishment of any religious instruction,” he bemoaned to
Thomas Cooper that “[i]n our University you know there is no
professorship of divinity. [A] handle has been made of this to
disseminate an idea that this is an institution, not merely of no
religion, but against all religion.”36 Later he would tell a political
ally that the claim that he sought a “government without religion”
was a “slander[ ].”37 Admittedly, Jefferson believed that in a
rational American republic, the successful religion in the public
square would be Unitarianism, but he believed that this would be
the result of citizens’ choices in a free market of religion.38 He never
sought to ban public religion.
34. “Government religion” seems to be an oxymoron, but the Supreme
Court’s recent embrace of corporate religion might give pause in that regard.
See generally Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35 (2015).
35. HARRY Y. GAMBLE, GOD ON THE GROUNDS 3 (2020).
36. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-3137
[https://perma.cc/6PNC-2E9Y] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to DeWitt Clinton (May 24, 1807), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-5622
[https://perma.cc/6YFW-ZYUR] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
38. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Waterhouse (June 26,
1822), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/9801-02-2905 [https://perma.cc/D7A4-UBPL] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) (Jefferson predicted in 1822 that “there is not a young man now living in the US who
will not die an Unitarian”). A few months later, “[c]oding reason as masculine,”
and demonstrating deep misgivings about evangelical enthusiasm, Jefferson
wrote to William Short that were a Unitarian minister to come to Virginia, he
“would gather in to their fold every man under the age of 40. female fanaticism
might hold out awhile longer.” ALAN TAYLOR, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S EDUCATION
224 (2019) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Oct. 19,
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Perhaps most telling in this regard is the fact that Jefferson’s
views on religion and separation of church and state did not prove
to be a death knell for religion in the early republic as his political
and religious opponents predicted. In fact, quite the contrary.
Freed from government interference, enjoying a free market for
religion, religion and religious organizations experienced a
separation-induced explosion in a period referred to as the Second
Great Awakening. It was in this period that many new American
sects arose: Disciples of Christ, Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, African Methodist Episcopal Church, Oneidians,
Seventh-Day Adventists, etc.39 Alexis de Tocqueville saw the broad
influence of religion in America as the direct result of separation.40
Theodore Dwight Woolsey, the President of Yale and of the
Evangelical Alliance, would explain in 1873 that “all unite in
believing” that separation at the Founding “was a blessing to
religion.”41 In fact, some of those who had previously opposed
Jefferson based on his efforts to separate church and state conceded
(some reluctantly) that the process of freeing religion from
government and embracing the “voluntary principle”¾religious
choice had to be entirely voluntary, uninfluenced by government
inducement or discouragement¾had greatly benefited religion.
Lyman Beecher, a leading nineteenth century evangelical and no
friend of Jefferson’s, conceded that the end of the establishment and
adoption of the voluntary principle was “the best thing that ever
happened to the State of Connecticut. It cut the churches loose from
dependence on state support. It threw them wholly on their own
resources and on God.”42 As Andrew Seidel concludes, “[a] secular

1822), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/9801-02-3103 [perma.cc/J6TD-3W6K] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021)).
39. See generally Curtis D. Johnson, “Sectarian Nation”: Religious Diversity in Antebellum America, 22 OAH MAG. OF HIST. 14 (2008).
40. See James T. Schleifler, Tocqueville, Religion, and “Democracy in
America”: Some Essential Questions, 3 AM. POL. THOUGHT 254, 258–60 (2014).
41. T. Jeremy Gunn, The Separation of Church and State versus Religion
in the Public Square, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 15,
33 (quoting THEODORE DWIGHT WOOLSEY, THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES IN REGARD TO RELIGION 4 (1873)).
42. 1 LYMAN BEECHER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LYMAN BEECHER 152–53
(Barbara M. Cross ed., 1961) (emphasis original).
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state fostered a religious people; a seeming paradox that has been
borne out.”43
These thoughts led me to consider several questions that
engaged Jefferson, and continue to engage us, relating to the
religiosity of the American people in the face of a high wall of
separation between church and state: First, if the government
cannot be “religious” does that interfere with the government
encouraging virtue and morality, characteristics that early
Americans almost universally saw as essential in a republic?
Second, how, if at all, are government officials to express their own
religiosity? Third, to the extent that the First Amendment is
intended to prevent government “coercion” in the area of religion,
does Jefferson (and history) speak persuasively to the meaning of
coercion? Can the government “endorse” religion or speak in a
religious voice, without running afoul of the Establishment Clause?
Finally, I have several brief historic observations on the question of
how the free exercise of religion is to continue on the private side of
the wall in the face of laws that interfere with some people’s
religious practices?
In analyzing those issues, I will focus particularly on
Jefferson’s thought (and James Madison’s, with Jefferson’s trusty
lieutenant never more in agreement with Jefferson than on the
issue of church-state relations). Not only has the Jeffersonian
vision of a wall of separation played a central role in the
development and understanding of American religious freedom, but
my current position gives me an opportunity to reflect regularly on
that vision and to discuss it with the public. I do not expect to cover

43. Andrew L. Seidel, Bad History, Bad Opinions: How “Law Office History” Is Leading the Courts Astray on School Board Prayer and the First
Amendment, 12 N.E. U. L.R. 248, 318 (2020). Even today, with the separation
of church and state, the United States is one of the most religious of the developed nations. IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT,
RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 3 (2014). The two are clearly related and were understood
to be so during the founding era: “Madison, for example, contrasted the erosion
of religion in establishment states with the flourishing of religion in nonestablishment states of his day.” John Witte, Jr., Introduction to NO ESTABLISHMENT
OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 3, 8. Today, I remind guides at Monticello that
an establishment persists (in various forms) in Italy, Germany, and the United
Kingdom, for example, but their churches are empty compared to churches in
the United States. See Being Christian in Western Europe, PEW RES. CTR. (May
29, 2018), https://www.pewforum.org/2018/05/29/being-christian-in-westerneurope/ [https://perma.cc/YQ9G-FLD2].
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any of these issues exhaustively, but, perhaps, to look at some of
these important issues in a somewhat new way.
I.

WHY A WALL?

It is useful to begin with at least some notion of why Jefferson
sought broad religious freedom and a strict wall of separation. His
views in this regard arose from three (interrelated and overlapping)
motivations. Commentators generally attribute Jefferson’s
insistence on separation to political and philosophical motivations,
and these were certainly important. I believe, however, that
Jefferson likely shared with eighteenth-century evangelicals’
theological reasons to insist upon a wall of separation.
A. Political Motivations
The political motivations for a separation of church and state
are, perhaps, most obvious.
At the time of the American
Revolution, Virginia still had an established church¾the Church of
England¾and religious dissenters (especially evangelical
Presbyterians and Baptists) had faced serious discrimination and
then persecution in colonial Virginia.44 With the onset of the
Revolution, Virginia’s dissenters insisted upon religious freedom,
including a separation of church and state, in return for their
whole-hearted support for the military fight against Britain.45
With dissenters representing from one-fifth to perhaps more than
one-third of the population, and especially dominant among the
rifle-toting Presbyterian settlers in the Shenandoah Valley, their
aid was desperately needed, and the establishment substantially
yielded.46 Certainly, the evangelical dissenters, having suffered
serious discrimination and persecution at the hands of the state
because of their religious beliefs, had a strong political reason to
demand separation.47
These concerns also motivated Jefferson and Madison. The
latter was apparently brought to his views on church-state relations
44. RAGOSTA, supra note 12, at 3-13. Other colonies also had varying levels of official establishments, but Virginia’s took on an outsized role both in the
Revolution generally and particularly on the issue of church-state relations.
See generally id.
45. Id. at 6–7.
46. Id. at 3–4.
47. Id. at 6.
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in part because of the attacks on dissenters immediately before the
Revolution. Writing to a good friend from his Princeton days,
Madison let his anger and exasperation boil over:
That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution
rages among some and to their eternal Infamy the Clergy
can furnish their Quota of Imps for such business. This
vexes me the most of any thing whatever. There are at this
{time?} in the adjacent County not less than 5 or 6 well
meaning men in close Goal for publishing their religious
Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox. I have
neither patience to hear talk or think of any thing relative
to this matter, for I have squabbled and scolded abused and
ridiculed so long about it, [to so lit]tle purpose that I am
without common patience.48
Jefferson, returning to Virginia in late 1776 from the Continental
Congress (after drafting the Declaration of Independence), joined
the new Virginia House of Delegates and helped to lead the
legislative battles to dismantle the establishment.49 Late in life, he
would refer to these legislative battles as the “severest contest in
which I have ever been engaged,” an extraordinary statement from
someone with as full a history of legislative battles as Jefferson.50
Informed by a long history of political discord fed by churchstate relations, and committed to the civil equality of all citizens,
Jefferson saw a political necessity in a wall of separation. He
believed that history had a clear lesson: political tyrants used
religious leaders, and religious leaders used political tyrants, to
prop each other up at the expense of the people.51 Jefferson
bemoaned the alliance of “kings, nobles and priests,” telling his
mentor George Wythe that this alliance had “loaded with misery”

48. Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0029
[perma.cc/493H-PWH4] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
49. Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, 6 Jan.–29 July 1821 (Jan. 6, 1821),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-021756 [https://perma.cc/GKQ5-TA9T] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
50. Id.
51. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Sep. 23, 1800), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-32-02-0102
[https://perma.cc/K2F5-6CUT] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).

2021]

IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION?

559

the people of France.52 Twenty-eight years later he was still
adamant about the danger that such an alliance posed for the body
politic: “[I]n every country and in every age, the priest has been
hostile to liberty. [H]e is always in alliance with the Despot.”53
“[M]isgovernment” was the product of “the selfish interests of kings,
nobles and priests,” he informed a favorite granddaughter.54 He
told his dear friend John Adams that separation of church and state
“put down the aristocracy of the clergy, and restored to the citizen
the freedom of the mind.”55
The danger was that an alliance between aristocrats and clergy
would seek to usurp the proper role of free citizens. Governments
in Europe, owing “their organisation [sic] [to] kings, hereditary
nobles, and priests,” were unresponsive to the people.56 Writing to
a Jewish leader, Jefferson used the third person to report that:
[I]t excites in him the gratifying reflection that his own
country has been the first to prove to the world two truths,
the most salutary to human society, that man can govern
himself, and that religious freedom is the most effectual
anodyne against religious dissension: the maxim of civil
government being reversed in that of religion, where it’s
[sic] true form is “divided we stand, united we fall.”57

52. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Aug. 13, 1786), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0162
[perma.cc/3A5J-MR8Z] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Horatio G. Spafford (Mar. 17, 1814),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-07-020167 [perma.cc/9C2E-WXDK] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
54. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Ellen Wayles Randolph Coolidge
(Aug. 27, 1825), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-5493 [https://perma.cc/K9Y4-2CM7] (last visited Feb. 17,
2021).
55. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0446
[https://perma.cc/RL7B-CCDY] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
56. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Jun. 12, 1823),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-023562 [https://perma.cc/2GHZ-LZJZ] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
57. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jacob De La Motta (Sept. 1, 1820),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-021488 [perma.cc/JLM7-2LNU] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
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Given the history of religious strife in Europe in which “oceans
of human blood” had flowed because of wars over religious dogma,
religious freedom and separation in America would be especially
essential because that republic would include people from a broad
mix of regions, ethnicities, and religions.58 Similarly, modern court
cases rely on the central role that maintaining religious peace and
discouraging religious discord played in the crafting of the First
Amendment.59
B. Enlightenment (Philosophical) Motivations
Not surprisingly, Jefferson’s Enlightenment philosophy also
supported a separation of church and state for similar reasons. The
progress of the human mind is at the center of the hopes of the
Enlightenment, but Jefferson believed that the full progress of
which the mind is capable would be impossible if religious leaders,
using the power and authority of the state, could impose or coerce
(or even use state authority to encourage) religious beliefs.60 This
interfered with the “freedom of the mind” which Jefferson referred
to in his October 1813 letter to Adams.61 It was in this context of
religious freedom that Jefferson famously wrote that “I have sworn
upon the altar of god eternal hostility against every form of tyranny
over the mind of man.”62 Jefferson clearly understood this
insistence on free inquiry as being good for, rather than harmful to,
religion. “Reason and free enquiry, . . . [g]ive a loose to them, they
will support the true religion, by bringing every false one to their
tribunal, to the test of their investigation.”63
In fact, Jefferson believed that no true or honest belief could be
imposed upon the mind by government coercion, but that the effort
58. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Fishback (Draft) (Sept. 27,
1809), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/0301-02-0437-0002 [https://perma.cc/7KTN-5HTA] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
59. See, e.g., Sch. Dist.of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214
(1963).
60. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, H.D. 82, 1779 Gen. Assemb.
(Va. 1786), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0082 [https://perma.cc/53ZT-XSLE] (last visited Feb.
17, 2021) [hereinafter Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom].
61. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, supra note 55.
62. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, supra note 51.
63. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William
Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1982) (1785).
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to do so would thwart the necessary growth of intellectual freedom
and thought. It was for this reason that Jefferson objected to
“putting the Bible and Testament into the hands of the children at
an age when their judgments are not sufficiently matured for
religious enquiries.”64 Alan Taylor explains that “[b]y precluding
rational and critical inquiry, Jefferson alleged, premature exposure
to theology prepared children to submit to arbitrary authority as
adults. If kept free from religion in the early classroom, however,
children would have time to cultivate a moral sense, which he
deemed natural to every person.”65 This is why he urged his
nephew Peter Carr of the necessity of thinking for oneself,
especially in the context of religion.66
Believing that a church-state alliance encouraged
ignorance¾blind following of an “official” worldview rather than
rational inquiry¾Jefferson reasoned:
[O]rganisation [sic] of kings, hereditary nobles, and priests
. . . to constrain the brute force of the people, . . . deem it
necessary to keep them down by hard labor, poverty and
ignorance, and to take from them, as from bees, so much of
their earnings as that unremitting labour shall be
necessary to obtain a sufficient surplus barely to sustain a
scanty and miserable life.67
Eliminating any government control or influence in the realm of
religion would prevent this danger. Explaining Jefferson’s view,
historian Johann Neem makes the same point: “[B]ecause God had
created ‘the mind free,’ each person had to make his or her own
determinations about faith. . . . Since God had granted us the
ability to think, to deny us that right was sinful as well as
tyrannical.”68

64. Id. at 147.
65. TAYLOR, supra note 38, at 164.
66. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0021
[perma.cc/A78Y-NU4W] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
67. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, supra note 56.
68. Johann N. Neem, A Republican Reformation: Thomas Jefferson’s Civil
Religion and the Separation of Church from State, in A COMPANION TO THOMAS
JEFFERSON 91, 95 (Francis D. Cogliano ed., 2011).
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Madison believed the same. He had a clear “conviction that the
most harmful effect of ‘established religion’ (that is, compelled and
formalized religion) was its suppression of the vital, useful energies
that flowed from the unrestrained practice of religion in the public
sphere—and eventually to the practice of citizenship in a selfgoverning society,” Ralph Ketcham argues.69 Free thought was
essential to an enlightened republic, but one could not have political
freedom or freedom of the mind in the face of the cooperation of
church and state. For Jefferson and Madison, Jack Rakove
explains, “[t]he attack on establishment flowed logically, perhaps
even necessarily, from the commitment to freedom of conscience.”70
As Jefferson himself put it, “[f]or the use of . . . reason . . . every
one [sic] is responsible to the god who has placed it in his breast, as
a light for his guidance, and that, by which alone, he will be
judged.”71
Both the political and philosophical justifications for
separation were particularly focused on protecting religious
minorities as they faced the risk of political prosecution and their
thought was more likely to be impaired by government decrees
touching religion.
C. Theological Motivations
Jefferson spent a great deal of time studying religion
(including comparative religions) and thinking about his own
beliefs.72 These were not matters to which he had given only

69. Ralph Ketcham, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and the Meaning
of “Establishment of Religion” in Eighteenth-Century Virginia, in NO
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 158, 160.
70. Jack N. Rakove, Beyond Locke, Beyond Belief: The Nexus of Free Exercise and Separation of Church and State, in RELIGION, STATE, AND SOCIETY:
JEFFERSON’S WALL OF SEPARATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 37, 47 (Robert
Fatton, Jr. & R. K. Ramazani eds., 2009).
71. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carver (Dec. 4, 1823), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-3903
[https://perma.cc/2U37-BR4S] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
72. Jefferson’s study of comparative religion explains his purchase of a
1734 edition of George Sales’ translation of the Koran in October 1765 while
Jefferson was studying law in Williamsburg. Claims that Jefferson purchased
the book merely as a means to “know your enemy” during the conflict with
Barbary pirates are false and revisionist. See Wm. Scott Harrop, Jefferson
Unafraid
of
the
Koran
(Jan.
17,
2007),
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passing consideration. Jefferson, a deep theist, believed in a
“benevolent creator” God who deserved to be praised.73 He
believed, at least early in life, but likely later as well, in an afterlife
with rewards and punishment.74 He believed that people would
(and should) be judged on their actions, part of his firm
renunciation of Calvinism and the idea of salvation by grace
alone.75 He rejected many of the central tenets of Christianity:
Jesus’ divinity, the resurrection, the atonement, original sin,
Biblical miracles, the Trinity. Critically, having studied many
religions, from classical Greece through his own era, Jefferson
concluded that all religions agreed on the fundamental rules of
morality and virtue. Their disagreements tended to be overly
technical and what he saw as less important issues of dogma, issues
for which rivers of blood had been spilled in Europe.76
His views on religion contributed importantly to his views on
religious freedom, including separation of church and state and
arguably paralleled the theological reasons why many eighteenthcentury evangelicals supported a strict separation.
A central element of religion for eighteenth-century
evangelicals was an insistence on a personal relationship with God,
i.e., one not mediated through priests, bishops, or the
government.77 Theologically, evangelicals reasoned that since all
God wanted from humans was a personal commitment, that
commitment had to be entirely voluntary, a free will commitment.
A commitment to God resulting from government intervention was
of no interest or value to God.78 Presbyterian clergy in Virginia
http://www.payvand.com/news/07/jan/1194.html [https://perma.cc/3JS9-N8
A7].
73. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac Story (Dec. 5, 1801), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-36-02-0025
[https://perma.cc/Q73W-XA6M] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
74. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Page (Jul. 15, 1763), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0004
[https://perma.cc/DP2L-H7ER] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
75. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, supra note 36.
76. See, e.g., RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 8, 16–17, 26.
77. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 22–23.
78. See James H. Smylie, Jefferson’s Statute for Religious Freedom: The
Hanover Presbytery Memorials, 1776–1786, 63 AM. PRESBYTERIANS J. 355, 371
(1985) (quoting Petition from the Inhabitants of Augusta County to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Aug. 13, 1785)).
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explained that “[r]eligion is altogether personal . . . it is not, cannot,
and ought not to be, resigned to the will of the society at large; &
much less to the Legislature.”79 Rejecting a proposed tax that
would have paid clergy a salary, these Presbyterians added:
It is urged, indeed, by the Abettors of this Bill, that it would
be the means of cherishing Religion and Morality among
the Citizens. But, it appears from fact, that these can be
promoted only by the internal Conviction of the Mind, & its
voluntary choice which such Establishments cannot
affect.80
Additional petitions further underscore this religious relationship:
“For the discharge of the duties of Religion every man is to account
for himself as an individual in a future state . . . not to be under the
direction or Influence of any Human being.”81 “But that the duty
which we owe our Creator and the manner of discharging it can only
be directed by reason and conviction; and is no where [sic]
cognizable but at the Tribunal of the Universal Judge.”82
Other ministers echoed similar theological reasons to keep the
government out of religion. Baptists fighting the proposed tax
assessment to support religion insisted that the legislature “leave
them entirely free in matters of Religion.”83 During the hotlycontested election of 1800, a Democratic-Republican minister
79. Id. (quoting Petition from Augusta County, supra note 78)
80. Id. (quoting Petition from Augusta County, supra note 78); This and
other cited petitions are also available from a collection maintained by the Library of Virginia. See Legislative Petitions Digital Collection, LIBRARY OF VA.,
http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions. In the past, the Library
conveniently maintained a separate collection of petitions related to religion,
but they are now part of a combined collection.
81. Petition from the Inhabitants of Rockbridge County to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (November 2, 1785) (emphasis
added); see also RAGOSTA, supra note 12, at 152 (“It is the duty of every man for
himself to take care of his immortal interests in a future state, where we are
to account for our conduct as individuals; and it is by no means the business of
a Legislature to attend to this.” (quoting Petition from Presbyterian Clergy to
the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (November 12, 1784))).
82. Smylie, supra note 78, at 362 (quoting Petition from the Hanover Presbytery to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (July-Sept.,
1776)).
83. See Petition from the Inhabitants of Amelia County to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 18, 1785). This was a version
of the “Spirit of the Gospel” petition copied by numerous Baptist congregations.
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explained that “[r]eligion is a concern between the soul of a man
and his maker.”84
As such, Stanley Griswold explained,
“[w]herever religion has been leagued with temporal policy . . . it
has uniformly been corrupted.”85 John Leland, a leading Baptist
minister in Virginia at the time, was adamant:
Every man must give an account of himself to God, and
therefore every man ought to be at liberty to serve God in
a way that he can best reconcile to his conscience. If
government can answer for individuals at the day of
judgment, let men be controlled by it in religious matters;
otherwise, let men be free.86
Any interference in religion was counter-productive:
“[c]ompulsion in matters of Religion would be so far from engaging
men to be what it proposes, that it would rather prejudice them
against it.”87
The point was made by Isaac Backus, a
Massachusetts Baptist minister, in the context of a draft bill of
rights for Massachusetts: “[a]s . . . nothing can be true religion but
a voluntary obedience unto [God’s] revealed will, . . . every person
has an unalienable right to act in religious affairs according to the
full persuasion of his own mind, where others are not injured
thereby.”88
Jefferson made important statements concerning religion that
have often been interpreted as simply reflecting his well-known
interest in privacy, but they seem to echo these theological
concerns. Jefferson would often respond to inquiries concerning his
own religion that “religion is a matter which lies solely between
84. STANLEY GRISWOLD, TRUTH ITS OWN TEST AND GOD ITS ONLY JUDGE
(1800), reprinted in ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, FINDING JEFFERSON app. B, at 199,
201 (2008) (emphasis removed).
85. Robert J. Imholt, Timothy Dwight, Federalist Pope of Connecticut, 73
NEW ENG. Q. 386, 396 (2000) (quoting GRISWOLD, supra note 84, at 17–18).
86. JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE (1791), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra note 22, at
177, 181.
87. See Petition from the Baptist Association of Powhatan County to the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 3, 1785).
88. Marci A. Hamilton & Rachel Steamer, The Religious Origins of Disestablishment Principles, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1755, 1775 (2006) (quoting William G. McLoughlin, Introduction to ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC
FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND
CALVINISM 304 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968)).
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Man & his God.”89 Religion is “a matter between every man and
his maker, in which no other, & far less the public, ha[s] a right to
intermeddle.”90 He warned another correspondent, “say nothing of
my religion. it is known to god and myself alone.”91 This was not
a mere matter of convenience or political expediency, but a matter
of theological principle for Jefferson:
I cannot give up my guidance to the magistrate; because he
knows no more of the way to heaven than I do & is less
concerned to direct me right than I am to go right. . . .
[co]mpulsion in religion is distinguished peculiarly from
compulsion in every other thing. I may grow rich by art I
am compelled to follow, I may recover health by medicines
I am compelled to take ag[ains]t. my own judgm[en]t, but
I cannot be saved by a worship I disbelieve & abhor.92
Laws could not provide for a defect in personal belief and action:
“[L]aws provide against injury from others; but not from ourselves.
God himself will not save men against their wills.”93
Madison made a similar profession in his famous Memorial &
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments: “[i]t is the duty of
every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as
he believes to be acceptable to him.”94

89. See Letter to the Danbury Baptists, supra note 1. It is notable that
Jefferson, while often insisting that he would not speak of his religion, seemed
to be constantly speaking and writing about it. By comparison, historians have
relatively little on James Madison’s religious beliefs and serious study on the
topic is overdue.
90. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Rush (May 31, 1813), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0155
[perma.cc/9WZL-F7GF] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
91. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Delaplaine (Dec. 25, 1816),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-10-020475 [https://perma.cc/6Z4A-HZ4J] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
92. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury (Oct. 11–Dec.
9, 1776), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0222-0007 [https://perma.cc/LZ4K-NN33] (last visited Feb. 19,
2021) [hereinafter Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury].
93. Id.
94. James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments ([ca. June 20] 1785), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163 [perma.cc/V58Y-5JF7] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
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Jefferson urged family members that they needed to come to
their own religious beliefs through private inquiry. He famously
wrote to his nephew Peter Carr urging him to:
[S]hake off all the fears and servile prejudices under which
weak minds are servilely crouched. Fix reason firmly in
her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion.
Question with boldness even the existence of god; because
if there be one, he must more approve the homage of
reason, than that of blindfolded fear.95
Referring to the coalition of evangelicals and political rationalists
who played such a critical role in the development of American
religious freedom, “strange bedfellows” indeed, Alan Taylor
explains that “[e]vangelicals and rationalists found common ground
by emphasizing individual, free choice as the basis of society—
within limits set by race and gender.”96
Jefferson’s theological concerns with separation are also
evident in his later-in-life devotion to the philosophy (but not the
divinity) of Jesus and a rather snarky comment that his crucifixion
was the first fruit of the cooperation of church and state.97

95. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, supra note 66. Trenchard
and Gordon, in their well-known “Cato’s Letters,” explained: “Every Man’s Religion is his own; nor can the Religion of any Man . . . be the Religion of another
Man, unless he also chooses it; which Action utterly excludes all Force, Power
or Government” independent of all “human Directions.” See GREEN, supra note
1, at 53 (quoting John Trenchard, Cato’s Letters, No. 60 (Jan. 6, 1721), reprinted in NEIL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY
COLLECTION 141 (1999)).
96. TAYLOR, supra note 38, at 58. Michael McConnell noted that “[i]t is,
indeed, a remarkable feature of the debates over establishment and disestablishment at the founding that the advocates of the establishment tended to
offer secular justifications grounded in the social utility of religion, whereas
the most prominent voices for disestablishment often focused more on the theological objections.” Michael W. McConnell, Establishment at the Founding, in
NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 45, 64.
97. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 18. Jefferson remarked that, utilizing
the power of church and state, the clergy had “crucified their own Savior who
preached that their kingdom was not of this world, and all who practice on that
precept must expect the extreme of their wrath.” Id. (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln (Aug. 26, 1801), in 35 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 147 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2008)).
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II. THE WALL OF SEPARATION

It is useful to start with the fundamental question: What does
the wall separate? On the one side, obviously, is the state, which is
to say the government. Simplistically, one might conclude that this
side of the wall is, or should be, entirely areligious. Indeed, it is the
fear of such areligion or amorality that, in part, seems to energize
much of the opposition to a wall of separation between church and
state. The complexity here is that while the government itself is to
be areligious, the “government” includes the individuals who make
up the government, from military personnel who might wish to
have chaplains to any government official who, as an official, does
not abandon his or her religion. Nor were they expected to. It is a
truism that a person’s religion will, and should, affect his or her
moral decisions, whether or not he or she is a government official.
Jefferson never expected nor wished that government officials
would behave in an amoral manner or in a manner that ignored
morality. As Stephen Green quite rightly observes, “a majority of
Framers expected that Christian principles would continue to play
a role in fostering civic virtue and providing a moral context for
public and private activity.”98
On the other side of the wall is the church, but more fully the
private sector. To be clear, the private side of the wall does not
mean “non-public” in the sense that activity cannot occur in the
public square; it means non-governmental. A simple example
suffices: a Christmas crèche scene displayed in a government
building raises questions on the government-side of the wall. The
same crèche, displayed publicly at a private corporation’s
headquarters, is a matter for the private side of the wall.99
Separation “did not refer to a cultural separation of religion from
society, as many today assume,” Derek Davis explains, “but rather

98. GREEN, supra note 1, at 180.
99. For example, after Allegheny County’s government Christmas crèche
display was declared unconstitutional in County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989), it was displayed at the U.S. Steel
building in downtown Pittsburgh, see Pittsburgh Creche Endowment Fund,
THE
PITTSBURGH
FOUND.,
https://pittsburghfoundation.org/creche
[https://perma.cc/5MXT-AAJW] (last visited Mar. 12, 2021).
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an institutional separation of governmental and ecclesiastical
power.”100
In thinking about issues on the two sides of the wall, it is useful
(and calming) to remember that many of the fundamental churchstate issues have been resolved and are still not under serious
challenge, even with the increased pressure of some from within
and without government to breach the wall. Direct support for an
individual religion or sect is undoubtedly unconstitutional.
Similarly, financial support for all religion¾similar to Virginia’s
proposed general assessment bill¾in exclusion to other nonreligious activities, would quickly be held to be unconstitutional.101
Nor can the government engage in mandating (or prohibiting)
religious activities (other than through neutral legislation not
targeted at religion or religious activities, discussed below).102
Similarly, there is a broad consensus that government cannot
openly embrace a particular religion or sect103 (although the views
of several Justices on the necessity of coercion in the form of a fine
or punishment for a government violation of the Establishment
Clause, discussed further below, would, if adopted by a majority of
the Court, effectively reverse that long-standing prohibition).104
Looking at the issues that are still hotly contested, and, in
particular, questions that elicit interest of the public either directly
or implicitly, this Article will address four more complex problems
with a particular focus on Jefferson’s thoughts. First, if virtue and
100. Compare Derek H. Davis, The Continental Congress and Emerging
Ideas of Church–State Separation, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra
note 17, at 180, 200–03 (examining the developing understanding of the separation of church and state during the founding era that understood the separation not to foreclose all contact between religion and public life), with DANIEL
DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE 51–52 (2002) (wrongly equating “separation between
church and state” with “religious influences separated from public life and policy.” (emphasis original))
101. Although many of the private school voucher and tax programs challenge this principle by effectively allocating a large predominance of their
funds to religious schools. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140
S. Ct. 2246, 2259 (2020); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002).
This is an issue that the Court should try to address.
102. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 526, 546–47, 534 (1993).
103. Id. at 532.
104. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992).
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morality are necessary for a sound republic, and religion
encourages both, as almost all of the Founders certainly believed,
can government encourage religion generally while avoiding
sectarianism?
Is separation inconsistent with morality in
government? Second, how can public officials act on their own
religiosity? Third, if government does sometimes seek to speak on
religion, or in a religious voice, for example ceremonial deism or
even declaration of a day of thanksgiving, what level of coercion to
belief is necessary to prohibit such activity? Fourth, can “religious
freedom” justify an exception to an otherwise valid law?
A. Virtue, Morality, and Religion
The Founders generally believed that to be successful a
republic required moral and virtuous citizens. John Adams made
the point using his nom de plume Novanglus: “[l]iberty can no more
exist without virtue and independence, than the body can live and
move without a soul.”105 Classic republican doctrine, recognizing
the fragility of a republic, advocated for virtuous leaders. “Talk of
virtue was not so much pious cant,” Derek Davis explains; “it was a
serious proposal to arrest the otherwise inevitable mortality of
political society. The success of the body politic would, the
[Continental] Congress held, be dependent on the character of the
people it comprised.”106
Similarly, most of the Founders would have agreed that
religion promoted such morality and virtue. Perhaps the most
commonly referenced statement of this idea is George Washington’s
Farewell Address given when he stepped-down from the
presidency:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political
prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable
supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of
Patriotism, who should labour to subvert these great
pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the
duties of Men and Citizens. . . . And let us with caution
indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained
without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the
105. Letter To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay (Feb. 6,
1775), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-0202-0072-0004 [https://perma.cc/FVF5-K4DW] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
106. Davis, supra note 100, at 194–95.
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influence of refined education on minds of peculiar
structure; reason and experience both forbid us to expect
that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious
principle.107
Those seeking to breach the wall of separation have reasoned that
the republic needs virtue, religion encourages virtue, so
government should encourage religion, and they claim the
endorsement of the Founding generation.108 Washington’s address
is offered as a “proof-text” for the need for government support of
religion.109
Many of the Founders, certainly Jefferson and Madison (and
Washington), would disagree. Jefferson and Madison “sought the
total rejection of the time-honored precept that the good of both
church and state required direct, statutory, and even financial
support of some or all religious creeds or institutions, or required
the diminishment or disadvantage of any other creed or
institution[,]” Ralph Ketcham explains.110
As a preliminary matter, to some extent the argument
misreads Washington’s address. Alexander Hamilton prepared a
draft of the Address for Washington in which he suggested that the
president expressly embrace government support for religion as a

107. Washington’s Farewell Address, supra note 22.
108. See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 76 (citing JAMES H. HUTSON,
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 54–57 (2008)). As
Lupu and Tuttle explain:
Earlier justifications for state funding of religion focused on the theological benefits of government care for the spiritual welfare of its subjects. For a variety of reasons, defenders of state aid for religion in
the early eighteenth century shifted their argument to a political footing. They claimed that support for an established faith was necessary
to promote morality and good order.
Id.
109. Gunn, supra note 41, at 25.
110. Ketcham, supra note 69, at 171. Ketcham goes on to recognize that, in
spite of support for separation, especially for Madison, “religion had a useful
and important role to play generally in the realm of the political.” Id. at 172.
Ketcham concludes that there was an unstated “friendly neutrality toward and
even encouragement of religions . . . [that] might be a worthy civic objective,”
if not a government one. Id.
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means to promote virtue.111 Hamilton would have had Washington
proclaim: “Does [national morality] not require the aid of a
generally received and divinely authoritative [r]eligion?”112
Washington rejected such an approach and deleted this portion of
the address.113 While the Farewell Address urges the importance
of religion to society, it does not support the idea of government
supporting religion. Ultimately, what Washington recommended
in that section of the address was support for public
education¾“[p]romote, then, as an object of primary importance,
institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge[ ]”¾a means to
support virtue and morality without involving the government in
religion.114 Jefferson made the same point about education and
promotion of morality, telling John Adams that his bill for the
General Diffusion of Knowledge (proposing a three-tiered system of
public education) “would have raised the mass of the people to the
high ground of moral respectability necessary to their own safety,
& to orderly government.”115
In this regard, Washington’s Farewell Address was not unlike
similar provisions in the Northwest Ordinance. That law, adopted
by the Confederation Congress and readopted by the first Congress
under the Constitution, declared that “[r]eligion, morality, and
knowledge, [are] necessary to good government and the happiness
of mankind,” but the Ordinance’s only call to government action in
that context was that “schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged.”116 Not unlike Washington’s removal of
Hamilton’s suggestion of government support for religion, a
provision specifically dedicating a parcel of government land in
each district to the promotion of religion had been removed from
111. Draft of Washington’s Farewell Address (July 30, 1796), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-20-02-01810002 [https://perma.cc/38LB-A66K] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
112. Id.
113. Compare id. (including language supporting the connection of public
morality with religious institutions), with Washington’s Farewell Address, supra note 22 (omitting language implying direct connection with established religion and morality); see also RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 159–60 (drawing same
comparison).
114. Washington’s Farewell Address, supra note 22.
115. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, supra note 55.
116. NORTHWEST
ORDINANCE
art.
3
(1787),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp [https://perma.cc/PQX7-RX5U].
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the original draft of the Northwest Ordinance; government was to
support education, but not religion.117 Madison was thrilled that
the provision had been removed, writing to James Monroe
incredulously: “How a regulation, so unjust in itself, so foreign to
the Authority of Cong[res]s so hurtful to the sale of the public land,
and smelling so strongly of an antiquated Bigotry, could have
received the countenance of a Comm[it]tee is truly matter of
astonishment.”118
In the Cincinnati Bible case, the Ohio Supreme Court
addressed this provision of the Northwest Ordinance specifically:
[T]rue ‘religion’ and ‘morality’ are aided and promoted by
the increase and diffusion of ‘knowledge,’ . . . and that all
three—religion, morality, and knowledge—are essential to
good government. . . . The truth is that these are matters
left to legislative discretion, subject to the limitations on
legislative power, regarding religious freedom, contained in
the bill of rights.119
As Andrew Seidel concludes, “[t]he Ordinance and farewell address
mention religion as a societal necessity, not a government
power.”120
Setting aside Washington’s address, others in the Founding era
argued more expressly that government support of religion was
essential to protect morality and virtue. For example, after the end
of the Revolution, many leaders in Virginia advocated a general tax
assessment to support Christian ministers and, as they defined it,
the religion that was requisite to support morality and virtue.121
Richard Henry Lee wrote to Madison that “the experience of all
times shows Religion to be the guardian of morals—and he must be
117. Letter From James Madison to James Monroe (May 29, 1785), NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0156
[perma.cc/T3CQ-2M98] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
118. Id. In a rather lame citation of historic precedent, Justice Alito’s opinion in American Legion v. American Humanist Association cites both Washington’s Farewell Address and the Northwest Ordinance, apparently as examples
of support of legislative prayer, and ignores the fact that in both cases the proposal for any government support of religion was excised. 139 S.Ct. 2067, 2087
(2019) (plurality opinion),
119. Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 244 (1872).
120. Seidel, supra note 43, at 319.
121. See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 77.
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a very inattentive observer in our Country, who does not see that
avarice is accomplishing the destruction of religion, for want of a
legal obligation to contribute something to its support.”122
A number of Virginia’s citizens joined in the fight for the
general religious assessment making similar arguments.
Petitioners from Warwick County insisted that “it is essentially
necessary for the good Government of all free states, that some
legislative attention should be paid to religious Duties.”123 Religion
is the “great safeguard against the corruption or usurpation of those
who govern on the one hand; and the most powerful security for the
subordination & obedience of those who are governed on the other,”
urged supporters from Surry County, on December 1, 1784.124 A
year later, petitioners from the same county argued that
throughout the Christian world, “the political as well as religious
effects of the Gospel have been thought worthy of Legislative
attention.”125 Outside the context of the General Assessment,
James Maury, one of Jefferson’s teachers, “explained that church
and government had ‘such a close & mutual Dependence &
connection with each other, & reciprocally give & receive such
Stability & Support to & from each other, that they must
necessarily stand or fall together.’”126
Some Founders would have agreed. Oliver Ellsworth, a
delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, chaired a committee of the
Connecticut legislature in 1802 concluding that as “peace, order
and prosperity of society” are a government’s main object,
“institutions for the promotion of good morals” are an appropriate
object of legislative support, and “religious institutions are

122. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1784),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-020079 [perma.cc/JP23-XYMW] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). In that letter Lee
goes on to explain that “true freedom embraces the Mahomitan and the Gentoo
as well as the Christian religion.” Id.
123. Petition from the Inhabitants of Warwick County to the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia (May 15, 1784).
124. Petition from the Inhabitants of Surry County to the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Dec. 1, 1784).
125. Petition from the Inhabitants of Surry County to the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 14, 1785).
126. TAYLOR, supra note 38, at 19 (quoting JAMES MAURY, TO CHRISTIANS OF
EVERY DENOMINATION AMONG US 31–32 (1771)).
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eminently useful and important” in that regard.127 It is worth
noting that Ellsworth’s support for such a program would have
involved the most mild form of establishment¾a general support
for religion only¾but an establishment nonetheless.128
Michael McConnell notes generally that to the Founding
generation’s “minds, republicanism both presupposed and
demanded a degree of public virtue exceeding that required in
monarchical regimes.”129 McConnell explores most specifically the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and its statement that
government depends “upon piety, religion, and morality” and that
these “cannot be generally diffused” without public support of
worship and religious instruction; therefore, Massachusetts
imposed a religious establishment130 (the last express religious
establishment to be eliminated in the United States when it was
overwhelmingly rejected by the people of Massachusetts in
1833131). While one might be hesitant to use this failed and vilified
model as a precedent, McConnell notes that the arguments of
Massachusetts Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons in Barnes v. First
Parish132 give the most thorough explanation for the alleged need
for church-state cooperation to promote virtue.133
Parson’s recognized that the state needs people to obey moral
duties beyond “the control of human legislation” (e.g., to promote
charity, benevolence, relations between husbands, wives, and
children).134 “The next step in Parsons’s argument was that the
best way for the government to inculcate the civic virtue needed for
community happiness is to support religion,” McConnell

127. William R. Castro, Oliver Ellsworth’s Calvinist Vision of Church and
State in the Early Republic, in THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS ON RELIGION AND
PUBLIC LIFE 65, 74 (Daniel L. Dreisbach, et al. eds., 2009). See also GREEN,
supra note 1, at 140–41.
128. Castro, supra note 127, at 74.
129. McConnell, supra note 96, at 58.
130. Id. at 59 (quoting MASS. CONST. art. III (1780), reprinted in MICHAEL
W. MCCONNEL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 33–34 (2d ed. 2002)).
131. See Nathan S. Rives, “Is Not This a Paradox?”: Public Morality and the
Unitarian Defense of State-Supported Religion in Massachusetts, 86 NEW ENG.
Q. 232, 232–33 (2013).
132. Barnes v. Inhabitants of First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. 401 (1810).
133. McConnell, supra note 96, at 60.
134. Id. at 61 (quoting Barnes, 6 Mass. at 405).
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concludes.135 “That is a far more troubling claim from our modern
disestablishmentarian point of view. But throughout most of
history, religious teaching has been one of the most powerful means
of inculcation of ideas of morality.”136 McConnell poses the
question: “Who was right? Jefferson or Parsons?”137 Of course, even
if one concludes that Parsons (who was supporting the policy that
was overwhelmingly defeated by the people of Massachusetts in
1833) was more correct than Jefferson and Madison at the time,
that begs the question of whether support for religion is still
necessary to protect morality.
Among the problems with Parson’s approach from a
Jeffersonian perspective, however, is whether government support
for religion is the best means to promote religion (and, thus, the
best means to promote virtue, even if one otherwise accepts the
argument’s logic). Many others during the Founding era grappled
directly with the issue of morality and virtue in government and
rejected even the mildest form of establishment or any government
support for religion. Indeed, the effort to impose a general
assessment for these purposes in Virginia, an example used by
those advocating government support for religion, was
overwhelmed by opposition from evangelicals and allies of Jefferson
and Madison, and the evangelicals not only rejected the tax but
135. Id.
136. Id. at 61–62. While this is undoubtedly true as a historic matter, it
does not rise to the level of necessity. For example, modern law and education
have found ways to encourage charities and sound familial relations without
resorting to a government-sanctioned religion.
137. Id. at 61. McConnell concedes, somewhat apologetically, that Parsons’
arguments are expressly restricted to Christianity, but insists that this is
merely a recognition that it was long-standing, “had long been promulgated,”
and was “well known” to Parsons. Id. at 62. McConnell urges that the point
for Parsons was not that government would endorse the view that Christianity
“was actually true . . . . [T]ruth was not a necessary element in his justification
for the establishment.” Id. This is too kind. Massachusetts specifically restricted its establishment to Christianity, and Parsons insisted that its “divine
authority [is] admitted” and it has been “found to rest on the basis of immortal
truth” Id. (quoting Barnes, 6 Mass. at 406). As others have pointed out, virtually all politicians who encourage government support for religious “truth” argue that it is their religion that carries such truth. See, e.g., Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60 (“[T]he impious presumption of
legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but
fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others,
setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others . . . .”).
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repeatedly addressed the broader issue and concluded that
government could promote morality and virtue without intervening
in religion. In fact, government intervention “in support” of religion
would do more harm than good for religion. During the legislative
debates over the general assessment, Madison framed the question
thus: “[The t]rue question [is] not—Is Rel[igion]: neces[sar]y? [But]
are Relig[iou]s Estab[lishmen]ts. necess[ar]y for Religion?”138
Perhaps the most telling analysis in this regard came from the
Hanover Presbytery, representing the Presbyterians of Virginia. In
1784, the year that the general assessment was proposed, the
Presbyterian clergy wrote a petition somewhat grudgingly
supporting a non-discriminatory assessment to fund ministers in
what the author of that petition (Samuel Stanhope Smith, a future
president of New Jersey College) argued was the mildest
manner.139 Referring to religion, the petition explained:
Neither is it necessary to their existence that they should
be publicly supported by a legal provision for the purpose,
as tried experience hath often shown; although it is
absolutely necessary to the existence & welfare of every
political combination of men in society, to have the support
of Religion and its solemn institutions as affecting the
conduct of rational beings more than human laws can
possibly do. On this Account it is wise policy in Legislation
to seek its alliance & solicit it’s [sic] aid in a civil view
because of it’s [sic] happy influence upon the morality of the
citizens, and its tendency to preserve the veneration of an
oath or an appeal to heaven, which is the cement of the
social Union. It is upon this principle alone in our opinion,
that a Legislative body has a right to interfere in Religion
at all, & of consequence we suppose that this interference
ought only to extend to the preserving of the public worship
of the Deity, and the supporting of Institutions for

138. Madison’s Notes for Debates on the General Assessment Bill (Dec.
1784), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/0108-02-0104-0003 [https://perma.cc/U4V4-5ZMF] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
139. See Smylie, supra note 78, at 360, 369.
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inculcating the great fundamental principles of all Religion
without which Society could not easily exist.140
Even with these caveats, the Presbytery insisted that the
assessment had to be made on the “most liberal” plan possible,
including non-discrimination.141 This Presbyterian petition, while
insisting that religion does not need government aid, provides
support for the type of generic encouragement of religion advocated
by Parsons, McConnell, and others, albeit insisting on nondiscrimination.
The debate, though, did not stop there. After this petition was
released, Presbyterians across the state were enraged with even
that lukewarm endorsement of government intervention in matters
of religion, even in the name of virtue and morality. Instead, they
rejected any government support of religion and did so most
emphatically, forcing the clergy who had supported the original
petition to recede.142 One year after the above-quoted petition, the
Presbytery went on record: “We oppose the Bill, Because it is a
Departure from the proper line of Legislation; Because it is
unnecessary, & inadequate to its professed end¾impolitic.”143 The
Presbytery agreed that there is a “happy influence of Christianity”
on the nation, but insisted that it was never so effectual in
encouraging morality and virtue as when left alone, free from all
government interference.144 Echoing the theological arguments in
favor of a strict separation, the Presbytery explained that
involvement of the civil power in religion was “destructive of
genuine morality.”145
Petitions from around Virginia made the same point, focusing
directly on the argument in favor of morality and virtue and

140. Petition from the Hanover Presbytery to the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Virginia (November 12, 1784).
141. Id.
142. See Smylie, supra note 78, at 359; RAGOSTA, supra note 12, at 121–27.
143. Petition from Presbyterian Ministers to the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 2, 1785); see also Smylie, supra note 78, at
370.
144. Petition from Presbyterian Ministers, supra note 143.
145. Id. McConnell cross-references the 1784 Hanover Presbytery’s support
of a general assessment in his argument in support of some government support of religion, see McConnell, supra note 96, at 59, the same petition that was
overwhelming rejected in 1785, see RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 86–87.
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insisting that the government could support morality and virtue
without supporting religion, even in a very general manner:
• Botetourt County, November 29, 1785:
Civil Government and Religion are, and ought to be,
independent of each other. The one has for its object a
proper Regulation of the external conduct of men toward
each other, . . . the other has for its object our internal or
spiritual welfare & is beyond the reach of human laws . . . .
[Prior] to the revelation of the Christian Religion . . .
Roman and Grecian governments [were] founded upon the
principles of Justice and equality [and] produced in the
citizens the encouraged virtues.146
• Powhatan County, Baptist Associations, November 3,
1785:
[We] are of opinion that the Church as a Spiritual body, has
a polity of its own intirely [sic] distinct from and
independent of all combinations of Men for Civil purposes
. . . . And as they think [the] Legislature will have
sufficiently done its part in favour of Christianity when
adequate provision is made for supporting those Laws of
Morality, which are necessary for private and public
happiness and of which it seems more properly the
Guardian than of the peculiarities of the Christian
Church.147
• Chesterfield County, November 14, 1785: “[B]ut it’s said to
be Necessary to unite the Church and State to keep men
moral and for to have confidence in an Oath we Humbly

146. Petition from the Inhabitants of Botetourt County to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 29, 1785), http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX] [Editors Note: all petitions are available through the virginia memory website
search engine but we are unable to provide url permalinks to the specific petitions being cited in footnotes 146–51.].
147. Petition from the Inhabitants of Powhatan County Baptist Associations to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 3, 1785),
http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PMBAAX].
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conceive the civil magistrate has a right to punish
Immorality so far as society is injured there by.”148
• Brunswick County, November 9, 1785: “Let laws punish
the vices and immoralities of the time . . . . Let ministers
manifest to the world that they are Inwardly moved by the
Holy Ghost.”149
• Montgomery County, November 15, 1785: “Good morals
are essential to civil society, but no indication that civil
laws are not adequate to that purpose. Right and wrong
can be derived from positive law, without seeking higher
[religious] authority.”150
• Mecklenburg County, December 24, 1784: “We think every
man ought to be left free from all compulsion in this
matter, except that of their own Reason & Conscience; This
we apprehend will be Best both for Church, & State.”151
In his Memorial & Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments, Madison agreed, explaining that religion (and its
social utility) did not need any government support:

148. Petition from the Inhabitants of Chesterfield County to the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 14, 1785), http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX]. The
Chesterfield petitioners went on to insist that civil laws should “let Jews, Mehometans [sic], and Christians of every Denomination injoy [sic] religious liberty, . . . . [F]ind their advantage in living under your laws [because] religion
is of god to man [as] the Civil law is of you to your people[,] . . . . [A]nd let the
Church of Christ and religion alone.” Id.
149. Petition from the Inhabitants of Brunswick County to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 9, 1785), http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX]. A
number of similar “Spirit of the Gospel” petitions were filed.
150. Petition from the Inhabitants of Montgomery County to the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 15, 1785), http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX].
151. Petition from the Inhabitants of Mecklenburg County to the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Dec. 24, 1785), http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX]. See
also Petition from the Inhabitants of Amelia County to the General Assembly
of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 9, 1785); Petition from the Inhabitants
of Caroline County to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia
(Oct.
27,
1785),
http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions
[https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX].
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Because the establishment proposed by the Bill is not
requisite for the support of the Christian Religion. To say
that it is, is a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself,
for every page of it disavows a dependence on the powers of
this world: it is a contradiction to fact; for it is known that
this Religion both existed and flourished, not only without
the support of human laws, but in spite of every opposition
from them, and not only during the period of miraculous
aid, but long after it had been left to its own evidence and
the ordinary care of Providence. Nay, it is a contradiction
in terms; for a Religion not invented by human policy, must
have pre-existed and been supported, before it was
established by human policy.152
Madison warned explicitly of the dangers posed to religion from
government support:
It is moreover to weaken in those who profess this Religion
a pious confidence in its innate excellence and the
patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still
reject it, a suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its
fallacies to trust it to its own merits.153
Years later Madison explained again why government support of
religion was not necessary for support of morality and virtue:
The settled opinion here is that . . . there are causes in the
human breast, which ensure the perpetuity of religion
without the aid of the law; that rival sects, with equal
rights, exercise mutual censorships in favor of good morals;
that if new sects arise with absurd opinions or overheated
imaginations, the proper remedies lie in time, forbearance
and example.154
On the force of these arguments, and thousands of signatures
of Jeffersonians and evangelicals, the General Assessment was

152. Madison, supra note 94.
153. Id.
154. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Mar. 19, 1823), NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-03-02-0015
[https://perma.cc/4JEA-W57C] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
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defeated.155 At the time, most viewed the proposed assessment as
precisely the type of general support of religion that is now
advocated by many of those opposed to a wall of separation.156 Of
course, one might argue that while such a tax is inappropriate, a
general support of religion by government endorsement is still
required to encourage morality and virtue; the arguments
referenced above are wholly applicable to even such a limited
scheme.
One of the reasons why government support of religion was
seen as unnecessary by Jefferson and Madison was their view that
all religions and philosophies tend to support similar ethical
regimes, i.e., similar concepts of morality and virtue. The
universality of such doctrines draws into question the need for
government support for religion. In Jefferson’s view:
Every religion consists of moral precepts & of dogmas. [I]n
the first they all agree . . . . [A]nd these are the articles
necessary for preservation of order, justice, & happiness in
society. [I]n their particular dogmas [they] all differ[ ] . . . .
& [these are] unimportant to the legitimate objects of
society.157
He reflected that, on the religious side of a disestablishment society:
Religion is well supported; of various kinds, indeed, but all
good enough; all sufficient to preserve peace and order: or
if a sect arises, whose tenets would subvert morals, good
sense has fair play, and reasons and laughs it out of doors,
without suffering the state to be troubled with it.158
And, on the secular side:
Man was destined for society. His morality therefore was
to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense

155. See Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent and the Virginia Disestablishment, 1776–1786, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 51, 86 (2009); RAGOSTA, supra note
1, 89–90.
156. See Susan Jacoby, The White House is Tearing Down the Wall Between
Church and State, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/opinion/sunday/church-state-supreme-court-religion.html [perma.cc/WZ9Y-SFBQ].
157. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Fishback (Draft), supra note
58.
158. See JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 161.
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of right and wrong merely relative to this. This sense is as
much a part of his nature as the sense of hearing, seeing,
feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the
truth . . . as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral
sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or
arm.
. . . If [your inquiry] ends in a belief that there is no god,
you will find incitements to virtue in the comfort and
pleasantness you feel in it’s [sic] exercise, and the love of
others which it will procure you.159
Thomas Paine said the same: “[a]ll religions are in their nature
mild and benign, and united with principles of morality.”160 While
Jefferson agreed that virtue was necessary in a republic, he
concluded that, given the universality of moral principles,
government need not intervene to promote religion.161
Indeed, government support would be counterproductive;
mixing church and state, as many of the evangelicals had noted,
would corrupt both. Madison told one correspondent that “[t]he
settled opinion here is that religion is essentially distinct from Civil
Gov[ernmen]t and exempt from its cognizance; that a connexion
[sic] between them is injurious to both.”162 Madison explained this
point at length:
159. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, supra note 66.
160. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 80 (1791).
161. See generally Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller (Jan. 23,
1808), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/9901-02-7257 [perma.cc/5XW6-TCBR] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). Madison, during the debates over ratification of the Constitution, underscored this point:
I go on this great principle, that the people will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there no virtue among
us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical
checks, no form of government, can render us secure. To suppose that
any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any
virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.
James Madison, Judicial Powers of the National Government (June 20, 1788),
NAT’L ARCHVIES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-020101 [https://perma.cc/4XUA-65M9] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). John Adams
also recognized that the Constitution was made for a moral/virtuous people,
but as Derek Davis notes, “not to produce them. The responsibility for virtuous
character must rest with the people.” Davis, supra note 100, at 196 (emphasis
in original).
162. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett, supra note 154.
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Notwithstanding the general progress made within the two
last Centuries in favor of this branch of liberty [religious
freedom], and the full establishment of it, in some parts of
our Country, there remains in others, a strong bias towards
the old error, that without some sort of alliance or coalition
between Government & Religion, neither can be duly
supported. Such indeed is the tendency to such a Coalition,
and such its corrupting influence on both the parties, that
the danger can not be too carefully guarded against . . . .
Religion & Gov[ernmen]t will both exist in greater purity,
the less they are mixed together. It was the belief of all
Sects at one time that the establishment of Religion by law
was right & necessary; that the true Religion ought to be
established in exclusion of all others; and that the only
question to be decided was, which was the true Religion
. . . . I can not speak particularly of any of the cases
excepting that of Virginia, where it is impossible to deny
that Religion prevails with more zeal, and a more
exemplary priesthood, than it ever did when established
and patronized by Public authority. We are teaching the
World the great truth, that Governments do better without
Kings & Nobles than with them. The merit will be doubled
by the other lesson, that Religion flourishes in greater
purity, without than with the aid of Government.163
Jefferson had said the same in the preamble to the Statute for
Establishing Religious Freedom: government support for religion
“tends also to corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant
to encourage, by bribing, with a monopoly of worldly honours and
emoluments, those who will externally profess and conform to
it.”164
When Jefferson was attacked for his alleged atheism by
political opponents, Jeffersonians made the same point. During the
presidential campaign of 1800, Tunis Wortman, a New York
Democratic-Republican, explained in A Solemn Address to
Christians and Patriots:

163. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-020471 [perma.cc/44H4-CCX9] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
164. Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60.
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Religion and government are equally necessary, but their
interests should be kept separate and distinct. No
legitimate connection can ever subsist between them.
Upon no plan, no system, can they become united, without
endangering the purity and usefulness of both¾the church
will corrupt the state, and the state pollute the church.165
One of the key means of corruption, if government sought to
support religion, would be the use of religion by politicians to
promote their own political interests at the expense of the people (a
concern with particular resonance today as “Court Evangelicals”
surround former President Trump in a mutual quest for power
(rather than grace)166). Madison identified such corruption of
religion as another problem with the proposed General Assessment.
Government support:
[I]mplies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent
Judge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ Religion
as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers
in all ages, and throughout the world: the second an
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.
....
. . . What influence in fact have ecclesiastical
establishments had on Civil Society? In some instances
they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the
ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances they have
been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny: in no
instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties
of the people. Rulers who wished to subvert the public
liberty, may have found an established Clergy convenient
auxiliaries. A just Government instituted to secure &
perpetuate it needs them not. Such a Government will be
best supported by protecting every Citizen in the
165. TUNIS WORTMAN, A SOLEMN ADDRESS TO CHRISTIANS AND PATRIOTS
(1800), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA,
1730-1805, 1479, 1488 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed. 1998).
166. See, e.g., John Fea, Courtiers and Kings, Evangelicals, Prophets and
Trump, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://religionnews.com/2020/
01/08/courtiers-and-kings-evangelicals-prophets-and-trump/ [perma.cc/3PQ34ZAL].
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enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which
protects his person and his property; by neither invading
the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to
invade those of another.167
In the preamble to the Statute, Jefferson explained:
[Allowing a] civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the
field of opinion and to restrain the profession or
propagation of principles on supposition of their ill
tendency is a dangerous falacy [sic], which at once destroys
all religious liberty, because he being of course judge of that
tendency will make his opinions the rule of judgment, and
approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they
shall square with or differ from his own.168
Religious leaders had made the same point. Reverend Elisha
Williams, in The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants,
noted wryly that “a religious establishment made by the civil
authority which they think is agre[e]able to the scriptures is
certainly agre[e]able to them.”169 More generally, as Ira Lupu and
Robert Tuttle of George Washington University School of Law note,
“nonestablishment also reduces religious groups’ incentive to
compete for political supremacy. If the machinery of government
may not be used to support or promote any faith, religious groups
will find control of government significantly less valuable.”170
Michael McConnell made a similar point: “Establishment was not
really about religion; it was about government control over the
formation of public opinion. And disestablishment was not an
attempt to curtail the influence or prominence of religion in public
life. It was to make religious practice free and independent, and
therefore strong.”171 While McConnell argues that this can be

167. Madison, supra note 94.
168. Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60.
169. ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF
PROTESTANTS (1744), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, 53, 75 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed. 1998).
170. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 23.
171. McConnell, supra note 96, at 65.
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accomplished while still permitting generic government support for
religion, Jefferson and Madison disagreed.172
Jefferson and Madison were quite clear that government
involvement would not promote religion, rather it would undermine
it.173 In a free market of religion, in contrast, religion, truth, and
virtue would all benefit, and, as noted above, building a wall of
separation in fact led to an explosion in American religion in the
Second Great Awakening.174 John Witte concludes that the
realization that religion (and, thus, its impact on virtue and
morality) would be strongest without any government assistance is
the most original American insight.175
Some would argue that the use of legislative chaplains is a
subset of this effort to have government encourage virtue and
morality. I will not here engage fully the question of the
constitutionality of chaplains, although the cases regarding
chaplains have certainly been full of bad history. Others have
explored the issue extensively.176 Several observations are in order
in this context, however: First, the hiring of legislative chaplains
had been justified largely as a historic exception since Marsh,177
based on some very weak history.178 For example, the Court
172. See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text. A distinction needs to
be made between government support of religion qua religion and support of
religion indirectly and in a neutral manner. Thus, Jefferson and Madison (and
the Supreme Court) would see an enormous difference in a government tax
system that promoted contributions to charities, including religious institutions, and a tax system that promoted contributions to religious institutions
but not to other charities. Cf. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct.
2246, 2254 (2020) (“We have repeatedly held that the Establishment Clause is
not offended when religious observers and organizations benefit from neutral
government programs.” (citations omitted)).
173. See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
175. Witte, supra note 43, at 12.
176. See generally George R. Kennedy, God(s) in Congress, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1731 (2013); Andy G. Olree, James Madison and Legislative Chaplains, 102
NW. UNI. L. REV., 145 (2008); Richard D. Rosen, Katcoff v. Marsh at TwentyTwo: The Military Chaplaincy and the Separation of Church and State, 38 UNI.
TOL. L. REV. 1137 (2007); Seidel, supra note 43, passim.
177. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
178. See Seidel, supra note 43, passim. I hate the term “law office history”:
good lawyers do not use bad history. The Marsh Court upheld legislative chaplains “almost exclusively on the precedent of First Congress.” GREEN, supra
note 1, at 13. For example, in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4
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ignored Madison’s statements that legislative chaplains were
unconstitutional and that such deviant precedent should not be
relied upon.179
Now, in American Legion, the Court plurality has eschewed the
common view that Marsh was based on a historic exception180 in
favor of an analysis of the First Amendment based on “a history and
tradition test.”181 This is a far more expansive and flexible doctrine
and, divorced from principle, makes little sense and poses
considerable danger. For example, will the Sedition Act now be a
precedent for free speech? In the Jim Crow era, where will we look
for “history and tradition” concerning the Equal Protection, Due
Process, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses? This approach
also seems to ignore change over time: Given that the states were
not bound by the First Amendment initially, how they adapted their
systems to religious freedom is probably more informative of how
(1987), while discussing Marsh, the Court explained that: “The Court based its
conclusion in that case on the historical acceptance of the practice. Such a
historical approach is not useful in determining the proper roles of church and
state in public schools, since free public education was virtually nonexistent at
the time the Constitution was adopted.” But see LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note
43, at 144 (while Marsh could be read as a narrow, historic ruling, Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), only a year later, upends that limitation by
granting leniency to government actions without any founding era analogy).
Some indication of the Court’s somewhat hollow attempt to treat Marsh as a
historic anomaly was evident in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576
(2014), where the Court stated that “Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its
historical foundation” despite expanding legislative prayer beyond even its dubious historical moorings.
179. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 807 (Brennan, J., dissenting). “Rather than let
this step beyond the landmarks of power have the effect of a legitimate precedent, it will be better to apply to it the aphorism de minimis non curat lex: or
to class it ‘cum maculis quas aut incuria fudit, aut humana parum cavit
natura.’” James Madison, Detached Memoranda (Jan. 31, 1820), NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-01-02-0549
[perma.cc/M4EL-PA9T] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021) [hereinafter Detached
Memoranda]. “I shall also take notice of one thing which appears to me unconstitutional, . . . [by that] I mean the thing of paying the chaplains of the civil
and military departments out of the public treasury. . . . If legislatures choose
to have a chaplain, for Heaven’s sake let them pay him by contributions, and
not out of the public chest.” LELAND, supra note 22, at 119.
180. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087 (2019) (plurality opinion).
181. See id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). But see id. at 2091
(Breyer, J., concurring) (rejecting a “history and tradition test”).
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they perceived the First Amendment (and the growth of a unique
American religious freedom) than their practice at its
adoption¾“history and tradition.”182
Second, much of the work on chaplains ignores the fact that the
hiring of a legislative chaplain was initially about preaching to
legislators.183 Inward looking preaching to government members
(who choose to attend) is very different from outward proselytizing
at public meetings that citizens attend for a multiplicity of
reasons.184 This distinction has broader implications, and were it
enforced as a requirement¾for example, requiring that any such
prayers before governmental meetings be addressed to members,
possibly having such prayers privately preceding public meetings,
etc.,—it would resolve much of the controversy concerning
government chaplains.185
Third, with respect to military chaplains, they were obviously
intended to preach to military members, not to proselytize publicly.
Madison recognized that in preaching to service members, military
chaplains may be different from other government chaplains: When
people are removed from normal access to ministers, their rights of
free exercise might otherwise be implicated.186 But, this means
that one must distinguish preaching to troops at wholly voluntary
services or counseling with troops (again, voluntary) and public
appearances by military chaplains. At a minimum, such use of
182. Certainly, state developments in the area of religious freedom are
highly relevant vis-à-vis the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf.
RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 132–68 (discussing state constitutional developments through the Supreme Court’s decision concerning the meaning of the
First Amendment in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878)).
183. See Galloway, 572 U.S. at 575 (framing legislative prayer as a neutral
acknowledgement of religion and reminder for legislators to work toward the
common good).
184. Cf. id. at 576–78 (noting import of voluntary participation).
185. See id. One also suspects that officials would be far less interested in
these prayers if they did not occur in public, thereby giving them the ability to
enlist profanely the imprimatur of religion for their own political purposes.
186. See Detached Memoranda, supra note 179 (expressing sympathy for
chaplains in a military context but concern that their use would be a justification for government chaplains in other contexts); see also Sch. Dist.of Abington
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting
that some objectionable government practices might be permissible in the penumbra between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses including,
“[p]rovisions for churches and chaplains at military establishments”).
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chaplains should be subject to all of the relevant restrictions: a
neutral choice of ministers, no proselytizing, and a clear indication
that religion is not “endorsed.”187
Finally, it is worth noting a growing problem with the theory
that the Founders would have accepted government support for
religion generally while eschewing support for any particular
religion, a problem resulting from the growing religious diversity of
the nation. Can government encourage religion generally, while
avoiding sectarianism? Proposals for “generic” support for religion
would have difficulty addressing growing nontraditional religions,
from Buddhism, to Taoism, to Hinduism, to Sikhism, much less
Rastafarianism, Druidism, Wicca, the Jedi Religion, Pastafarians,
etc.
Some conservative justices have sought to avoid this problem
by creating a new theory that would allow the government to
promote some, but not all, religions, what has historically been seen
as a complete anathema to the First Amendment:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and
practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the
advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or
promote one religion or religious theory against another or
even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.188
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Thomas, openly advocated the idea that only monotheist religions,
specifically Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, are fully protected by
the First Amendment, enjoying a special privilege of government
endorsement.189 Based on a rather distorted view of history, Scalia
reasoned that supporting these religions, all of which endorse the
Ten Commandments and accept (at least in part) the Bible as true
187. See, e.g., Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565. It is difficult for the government not to “endorse” religion when the person praying is in uniform¾as army
regulations, discussed below, recognize. See infra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
188. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968) (citing a long list of
precedent).
189. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893–94 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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revelation, was consistent with the Founders’ expectations.190 It is
worth noting that even Scalia would agree that the Establishment
Clause still prevents the government from directly funding these
religions.191
As a preliminary matter, this is an odd position for a textualist
to take; there is certainly no support in the text of the Constitution
for singling out particular religions for special treatment, and, as I
have shown elsewhere, many in the Founding generation were
aware of non-monotheistic religions that shared the protections of
religious freedom.192 Nor is there any basis in early American
history for combining Christianity, Judaism, and Islam for
preferred treatment.193 This focus on monotheism is part of a
history of revisionism by those seeking to encourage church-state
cooperation and breach Jefferson’s wall. What was originally
“Christian
preferentialism”¾government
could
support
Christianity generally but not any individual sect¾morphed into
“Judeo-Christian preferentialism” after the atrocities of World War
II made it simply politically unacceptable to exclude Jews; the term
“Judeo-Christian” was not one that eighteenth-century Founders
would have recognized.194 Thus, if one wants to rely on the
Founders’ views, broadly defined, on “acceptable” religions to
190. See id. at 909.
191. As others have pointed out, there is little reason for Scalia’s conclusion
that neutrality vis-à-vis different religions and religions versus irreligion applies to Free Exercise and affirmative funding of religion but does not apply to
endorsement¾other than the fact that this achieves the result sought by conservatives by in each instance effectively promoting the religion of the majority. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment
Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1117 (2006). In concluding that almost all
Americans endorse the Ten Commandments, Scalia ignores not only the significant differences in different religion’s versions of the Ten Commandments,
but the tens of millions of Americans who do not fall within his preferred list
of religions. Id. at 1119.
192. See id. at 1131.
193. See, e.g., James Loeffler, The Problem With the ‘Judeo-Christian Tradition,’ ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/08/the-judeo-christian-tradition-is-over/614812/ [https://perma.cc/2UFJBHYX].
194. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 151–53 (discussing how members of the
Court have used deeply misleading partial quotations and citations to morph
the Christian preferentialism advocated by some in the early nineteenth century into Judeo-Christian preferentialism).
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promote, inclusion of Judaism would be problematic. Scalia and his
cohort have now sought to morph the concept again into
monotheists in a “politically correct” effort to include Muslims.195
Setting aside the historic problems with the proposal, it would
enflame sectarian controversies¾something that separation of
church and state was intended to alleviate¾and tend to protect the
majority at the expense of the minority¾another position that flies
in the face of the purposes of the First Amendment.196 Others have
discussed this proposal at length,197 the point here is that it is
another effort to avoid the problems that would be created were the

195. See Colby, supra note 191, at 1118. If one wanted to limit protections
to the common “religion” at the time of the founding, that would exclude Judaism, Islam, and arguably Catholicism (and then courts would face the question
of what to do with “new” Christian sects that were arguably outside the understanding at the Founding, e.g., Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, etc. Compare Audrey Barrick, Devout Mormon Declares: I’m Not a Christian, CHRISTIAN
POST (June 14, 2012), https://www.christianpost.com/news/devout-mormon-declares-im-not-a-christian-76694/ [perma.cc/XB9M-U2Y9] (distinguishing Mormons from “mainline” Christian sects), with New Poll on Religion and the Election 2012: Romney’s Mormon Faith Likely a Factor in Primaries, Not in a
General Election, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 23, 2011), https://www.pewforum.org/2011/11/23/new-poll-on-religion-and-the-election-2012/
[https://perma.cc/9D93-KRL3] (noting that many White evangelical voters do
not consider Mormonism a Christian faith). Leaving these decisions up to
courts poses another set of problems. The problem is even evident in the Ten
Commandment cases since various denominations and religions use significantly different versions of the Ten Commandments. Justice Scalia, in arguing
that the government can erect Ten Commandment monuments, at the same
time argues that the government cannot engage in the argument about which
version is the most “authentic” or to be preferred¾but the erection of a monument, by choosing a particular version, effectively does just that. See Colby,
supra note 191, at 1108 n.35. Colby explains further that for Scalia, government invocation of “God” is not an establishment, but invocation of Vishnu,
Zeus, or polytheism is. Id. at 1110–11.
196. See id. at 1119.
197. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable
Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1587–90 (2010) (official acknowledgement of majoritarian Judeo-Christian religion creates an atmosphere that
alienates minority groups); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”:
The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 514–15 (1986)
(noting that promoting majoritarian religious practices as “secularized” due to
their long history in American society disadvantages religions that have more
recently developed or arrived); Gary J. Simson, Laws Intentionally Favoring
Mainstream Religions: An Unhelpful Comparison to Race, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
514, 515–16 (1994) (critiquing Establishment Clause theories that would advantage certain religions).
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government to be allowed to promote religion generally¾an
increasingly complex and ill-defined group¾in an effort to
encourage virtue and morality.
None of this, though, changes the fact that the Founders, while
wishing to end state support for religion, certainly expected that
officials would be virtuous and moral officials. That, though, raises
the question of how such officials should exercise their religion.
B. Public Officials/Religious People
Whatever the restrictions imposed on the government in terms
of promotion of religion, there was a broad anticipation at the
founding that the American people, including those who would hold
government office, would be a religious people. The same is true
today (although less so than in the past for the reasons noted at the
outset). It is notable, for example, that even while the share of
Americans who profess to be Christian or religious is declining
substantially, the share of elected officials identifying as Christian
is overwhelming. The Pew Research Center, for example, notes
that over 88% of the U.S. Congress identifies as Christian,
compared to a national average of 71% of U.S. adults being
Christian.198 High-ranking Trump administration officials were
likely even more heavily weighted to Christianity.199 While the
Civil Service may have a religious demographic that more closely
parallels the national average, this still begs a question: What can
a person who happens to be religious and happens to be an official
do about their religiosity on the “government side of the wall”?
Once again, Jefferson grappled with this issue, particularly in
the context of national prayer proclamations. Both of Jefferson’s
predecessors as president had issued prayer proclamations, as had
Jefferson as governor when directed to do so by the legislature.200
During the run-up to the Revolution, Jefferson had joined with
other members of the Virginia House of Burgesses to urge a day of
fasting and prayer in support of Boston after that port was closed
198. Faith on the Hill, The religious composition of the 116th Congress, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/2019/01/03/faith-onthe-hill-116/ [perma.cc/TSB8-8AN6].
199. This is not surprising; a majority will tend to dominate elections. It is,
though, another example of why it is so important that civil liberties protect
minorities; majorities tend to be protected through the legislative process.
200. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 189, 266 n.43.
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by Britain as part of the Intolerable Acts.201 Notably, though,
Jefferson would later report that he and a group of political radicals
had “cooked up” that declaration for its political effect, the type of
use of religion by politicians that he came to rail against.202 Of
course, there was no First Amendment at that time and Virginia
had not yet adopted the Statute for Establishing Religious
Freedom.203
As president, though, Jefferson understood that he was subject
to the prohibitions of the First Amendment Establishment
Clause.204 With that in mind, even when the country was faced
with the crisis of hundreds of sailors being impressed by the British
navy, and with the prospect of what would prove to be a devastating
embargo hanging over the nation, Jefferson insisted that it would
violate the Constitution for the president to call officially for a

201. Id. at 189.
202. Id. at 193. In spite of the “cooked up” comment, some commentators
continue to insist that Jefferson’s authorship of the prayer proclamation is evidence of his sincere religious commitment, but Jefferson told Daniel Webster
that he and his colleagues had to get someone else to introduce the resolution
because “[i]t would hardly have been in character for us to present them ourselves.” DANIEL WEBSTER, Notes of Mr. Jefferson’s Conversation, 1824 at Monticello, in 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, CORRESPONDENCE, 1798–1824, at
370, 374 (Charles M. Wiltse & Harold D. Moser eds., Univ. of Va. Press Digital
ed. 2018) (1974).
203. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 193.
204. See id. at 189–90. In American Legion, Justice Thomas suggested that
because the First Amendment begins “Congress shall make no law,” only the
legislature is bound by its provisions. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139
S. Ct. 2067, 2094–95 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). This is a startling and
outrageous claim. In Thomas’ view, then, neither the executive nor the judiciary are bound by the First Amendment’s protections against establishments
and for free speech, press, assembly, and free exercise. Under such a theory,
absent legislation, the president could insist that all executive branch hiring
be Presbyterians or prohibit all federal employees, if they want to keep their
jobs, from publicly (on social media or otherwise) saying anything derogatory
about the president. The executive could openly agree only to prosecute certain
crimes when committed by political opponents (such as perjury). The president
could announce that Islam is the official religion of the United States and will
be treated as such by the Executive Branch. Of course, the courts have consistently rejected this argument, see RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 263 n.2, but
Thomas’ willingness to even float the argument is breathtaking. (Does this
suggest that he believes the Trump administration¾with his wife being a key
lobbyist on such issues¾could ignore the anti-establishment clause?).
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His views in this regard are worth

I consider the government of the US. as interdicted by the
constitution from intermedling [sic] with religious
institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises. [T]his
results not only from the provision that no law shall be
made respecting the establishment, or free exercise, of
religion, but from that also which reserves to the states the
powers not delegated to the US. [C]ertainly[,] no power to
prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in
religious discipline, has been delegated to the general
government. [I]t must then rest with the states, as far as
it can be in any human authority. [B]ut it is only proposed
that I should recommend, not prescribe a day of fasting
[and] prayer. [T]hat is that I should indirectly assume to
the US. an authority over religious exercises which the
[C]onstitution has directly precluded them from. [I]t must
be meant too that this recommendation is to carry some
authority, and to be sanctioned by some penalty on those
who disregard it: not indeed of fine & imprisonment but of
some degree of proscription perhaps in public opinion.
[A]nd does the change in the nature of the penalty make
the recommendation the less a law of conduct for those to
whom it is directed? I do not believe it is for the interest of
religion to invite the civil magistrate to direct it’s [sic]
exercises, its discipline or its doctrines: nor of the religious
societies that the General government should be invested
with the power of effecting any uniformity of time or matter
among them. [F]asting [and] prayer are religious exercises.
[T]he enjoining [of] them an act of discipline, every
religious society has a right to determine for itself the times
for these exercises [and] the objects proper for them
according to their own particular tenets. [A]nd this right
can never be safer than in their own hands, where the
[C]onstitution has deposited it.206
James Madison, under pressure from Congress during the
national crisis that culminated in the War of 1812, did issue a
205. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, supra note 161.
206. Id.
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national prayer proclamation, but he later concluded that this was
an error, a violation of the Constitution.207 Even when issuing the
proclamation, Madison sought to minimize its impact:
[F]reed from all coercive edicts, from that unhallowed
connexion [sic] with the powers of this world, which
corrupts religion into an instrument or an usurper of the
policy of the state, and, making no appeal but to reason, to
the heart and to the conscience, can spread its benign
influence everywhere, and can attract to the Divine Altar
those free-will offerings of humble supplication,
thanksgiving and praise, which alone can be acceptable to
Him whom no hypocrisy can deceive, and no forced
sacrifices propitiate.208
Yet, while Jefferson was emphatic that if the president made
an official prayer proclamation it violated the Constitution, in both
of his inaugural addresses, Jefferson prayed. In the second
inaugural address, he supplicated:
I shall need too the favour of that being in whose hands we
are: who led our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native
land; and planted them in a country flowing with all the
necessaries & comforts of life; who has covered our infancy
with his providence, & our riper years with his wisdom &
power: & to whose goodness I ask you to join in
supplications with me, that he will so enlighten the minds
of your servants, guide their councils, & prosper their
measures, that whatsoever they do shall result in your
good, & shall secure to you the peace, friendship, &
approbation of all nations.209
In his first, he also prayed publicly: “And may that infinite power,
which rules the destinies of the universe, lead our councils to what
is best, and give them a favorable issue for your peace and

207. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 190–91.
208. James Madison, Presidential Proclamation (July 23, 1813), NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-06-02-0434
[https://perma.cc/MS8M-XJ82] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
209. Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1805), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-1302
[https://perma.cc/8L9K-JZXY] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021) (early access).
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prosperity.”210 Some critics have concluded that Jefferson was
simply being inconsistent. Daniel Dreisbach, for example, says that
these two situations were “virtually indistinguishable.”211
Jefferson obviously did not see it as such.212
There is a simple but powerful point that Jefferson was
showing in his actions: under the First Amendment, an official can
pray, even publicly, but he or she cannot pray officially. Justice
Stevens made the point in his Van Orden dissent: “when public
officials deliver public speeches, we recognize that their words are
not exclusively a transmission from the government because those
oratories have embedded within them the inherently personal
views of the speaker as an individual member of the polity.”213
Imagine a president leaving the White House on a Sunday
morning and telling a scrum of reporters stationed there that he is
on his way to church. This is very different from the president
approaching the cameras and microphones, surrounded by cabinet
officials, and saying it is time for all Americans to get up and go to
church accompanied by a proclamation on official letterhead to the
same effect. While undoubtedly there will be instances where it
might be difficult to discern on what side of that line an official’s
actions land, the concept was very clear to Jefferson.
The same issues were at work when Jefferson, as president,
attended church services held in the House of Representatives.
Those services, when the House was not otherwise in use, were not
based on a joint resolution of Congress nor official in any manner
as some have argued.214 In fact, with very few finished buildings

210. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-33-02-01160004 [perma.cc/6VH8-WY3P] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
211. DREISBACH, supra note 100, at 57.
212. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 191–92.
213. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 723 (2005) (Stevdreens, J., dissenting) (emphasis original).
214. See, e.g., 1 CHRIS RODDA, LIARS FOR JESUS: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT’S
ALTERNATE VERSION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 443–47 (2006). The situation was
not unlike the use of schools for church services on Sunday morning when not
otherwise in use. For an interesting take on this practice, see Bronx Household
of Faith v. Board of Education of New York, 750 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2014)
(accepting public buildings can be restricted in use for worship but not by religious groups generally). See also RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 193–98 (Jefferson
effectively prevented worship on the grounds at the University of Virginia
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in the young Washington D.C., the House was often used for
various, religious and non-religious, functions.215
Jefferson had made a similar point as a young man, noting that
a church receives no special privileges simply because an official is
a member:
[E]ach church being free, no one can have jurisdiction over
another; no not even when the civil magistrate joins it. [I]t
neither acquires the right of the sword by the magistrate’s
coming to it, nor does it lose the rights of instruction or
excommunication by his going from it. [I]t cannot by the
accession of any new member acquire jurisdiction over
those who do not accede. [H]e brings only himself, having
no power to bring others.216
In his Detached Memoranda, written after he left the White
House, Madison took on the same problem. He explained that “[i]n
their individual capacities, as distinct from their official station,
[officials] might unite in recommendations of any sort whatever; in
the same manner as any other individuals might do. But then their
recommendations o{ught?} to express the true character from which
they emanate.”217
Jeffersonians in the early republic recognized the distinction.
St. George Tucker, in his View of the Constitution, explained the
position of officials, thus: “They cannot, as public men, give
[religion] any other assistance [than example]. All, besides, that
during his lifetime but accepted impartially drawn access for religious activities in public facilities as a workable compromise).
215. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 196–97. After his retirement from the presidency, Jefferson would often attend church services in the Charlottesville
Courthouse where, lacking downtown churches, ministers from different denominations rotated who would lead the Sunday service (Baptist, Episcopal,
Methodist, Presbyterian). See Charlottesville and Albemarle County Courthouse Historic District, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/journey/cha.htm [perma.cc/T4VN-2MVU] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). When the
effort to build a nonsectarian church failed and several of the ministers decided
that they needed their own churches, Jefferson agreed to contribute (although
family ties and tradition still weighed on the former president: He gave $200
to build an Episcopal Church, $60 for a Presbyterian, and $20 for a Baptist).
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 2 JEFFERSON’S MEMORANDUM BOOKS: ACCOUNTS, WITH
LEGAL RECORDS AND MISCELLANY, 1767–1826, 1403 (James A. Bear, Jr., & Lucia C. Stanton eds., 2d ser., 2017).
216. Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, supra note 92.
217. See Detached Memoranda, supra note 179.
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has been called a public leading in religion, has done it an essential
injury, and produced some of the worst consequences.”218
Newspaper commentators took up the same refrain, writing that
Jefferson was “disclaiming a right to intermeddle with religion in
his capacity as chief magistrate.”219 Another was even more clear,
distinguishing between a “civil ruler, clothed with temporal power”
from action by the same official “in his private capacity, as a
man.”220 “Mr. Jefferson, in his political capacity, lets [religion]
alone . . . is not inclined to intervene with his power,” but privately
“attends public worship.”221 Modern commentators have noted the
difference between public performance and public official
performance, as have political scientists.222 It is worth noting that
Washington’s Farewell Address also joined this question, with
Washington emphasizing that it was not an “official” declaration,
rather, the “disinterested warnings of a parting friend.”223
Once again, undoubtedly there will be cases in which it may be
difficult to draw this line, but that does not mean that the point is
invalid. If anything, it means that additional care should be taken
by officials to ensure that they are not using their official position
to promote religion.
Importantly, the principle is not limited to religious exercise;
this same principle was and is at work in the government in other
ways, strengthening the argument for applying it in this context.
For example, Jefferson was also concerned with the question of
whether government officials could, as officials, engage in political
activity.
Jefferson’s Secretary of Treasury, Albert Gallatin,
proposed a circular letter to customs officers (the most numerous
218. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 373 (Liberty Fund 1999) (1803) (quoting RICHARD
PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 35–36 (1785) (emphasis

original)).
219. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 192 (quoting BRIDGEPORT REPUBLICAN
FARMER (Conn.), Oct. 2, 1805).
220. John A. Ragosta, A Religious Republican and a Republican Religion,
in JEFFERSONIANS IN POWER: IDEAS IN PRACTICE 59, 62 (Joanne B. Freeman &
Johann M. Neem eds., 2019) (quoting THE WITNESS (Litchfield, Conn.), Oct. 2,
1805).
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Martin Marty, Getting Beyond “The Myth of Christian America,” in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 364–65.
223. Washington’s Farewell Address, supra note 22.
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public officials at the time) clarifying this issue and shared a draft
with Jefferson.224 Gallatin wrote:
[W]hilst freedom of opinion, & freedom of suffrage at public
elections are considered by the President, as
imprescriptible [sic] rights, which, possessing as citizens,
you cannot have lost by becoming public officers; he will
regard any exercise of official influence to restrain or
controul [sic] the same rights in others as injurious to that
part of the public administration which is confided to your
care, and practically destructive of the fundamental
principles of a republican Constitution.225
Jefferson agreed: “I approve . . . entirely of the two paragraphs on
the participation of office, [and] electioneering activity.”226 This
distinction is still observed in key respects today. With respect to
political activity, the Hatch Act prohibits political activity by
federal officials when acting in an official capacity.227
A close parallel exists in regard to the right of service men and
women to engage in political activity. As with Gallatin’s customs
letter, regulations recognize that members of the military can
participate in political activity, but they must not use their military
position to do so.228 Thus, they are prohibited from wearing
military uniforms when participating in a political activity, e.g.,
attending a political rally.229 The same constraint should be
224. See Albert Gallatin, Enclosure: Circular to Customs Collectors (July
20, 1801), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-34-02-0486-0002 [perma.cc/2NKH-FRFF] (last visited Feb 19, 2021).
225. Id.
226. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (July 26, 1801), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-34-02-0495
[https://perma.cc/5NEZ-EJAT] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
227. See generally The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7321–7328. Unfortunately,
this law was wantonly ignored by the Trump Administration and should have
been enforced. See, e.g., Zach Montague, What is the Hatch Act? Is Trump Violating It at the R.N.C.?, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/us/politics/hatch-act-trump-rnc.html
[https://perma.cc/88V8-ESXV].
228. See generally DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 1344.10, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES (2008), https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Policies/doddirective134410.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RJ7S-57RL]
[hereinafter DOD Directive].
229. See id § 4.1.4. Similar restrictions apply in commercial settings to prevent a “military endorsement” of a product. See id. Unfortunately, there is a
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imposed on service chaplains when not directly officiating
voluntary religious services.
In the end, government officials may (or may not) be religious,
and their official positions in no way require that they cease being
religious or hide their religiosity (or, certainly, that they behave in
an areligious manner). Given that fact, it is a canard to argue that
separation means that officials cannot or will not behave in a moral
manner based upon their personal religious views. Nor is it
accurate to argue that a strict separation will undermine the
morality of the nation. Jefferson certainly understood this and
expected his officials to behave in a virtuous and moral manner. In
another relevant context, for example (as noted above), he wrote to
Gallatin specifically of government obligations to morality: “The
laws of humanity make it a duty for nations, as well as individuals,
to succor those who accident and distress have thrown upon
them.”230 For officials, in terms of their personal beliefs and
actions, as Seidel explains, “[r]eligiosity is irrelevant; religious
people fulfill government roles and offices all the time without
abusing those offices to promote or impose their personal
religion.”231 At the turn of the twentieth century, a North Carolina
court made the point like this:
The beautiful and divine precepts of the Nazarene do
influence the conduct of our people and individuals, and are
felt in legislation and in every department of activity. They
profoundly impress and shape our civilization. But it is by
this influence that it acts, and not because it is a part of the
organic law, which expressly denies religion any place in
the supervision or control of secular affairs.232
Thus, one can distinguish the National Prayer Breakfast, a
private but public event that political officials often attend, from
similar tendency in the Trump Administration to ignore these restrictions, and
on occasion, by Democrats as well. See Montague, supra note 227. These regulations should be enforced. The services should also prohibit service members
from wearing uniforms at church services (unless doing so on base or when
necessity requires).
230. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (January 24, 1807),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-024939 [perma.cc/9WHM-9NEG] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
231. Seidel, supra note 43, at 267.
232. See, e.g., Rodman v. Robinson, 47 S.E. 19, 21 (N.C. 1904).
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the National Day of Prayer, an inappropriate proclamation from
Congress.
The significance of this point goes beyond the fact that officials
should feel no constraints in exercising their personal religion.
Rather, it goes to the angst that seems to motivate many of those
who are concerned with a separation of church and state. As
Jefferson explained to one friend, the claim that he desired
“government without religion” was a “slander.”233
C. Government and the Problem of Coercion
Since government officials do not abandon their religiosity
when they join the government, and since the government can
engage in ceremonial deism234 and can accommodate individuals’
religious interests in the “joints” between the Establishment and
Free Exercise clauses, it begs the question of whether government
action, to violate the Establishment Clause, must be coercive of an
individual’s beliefs. Or, perhaps, the question is better put: how
coercive must government action be to violate the proscription?
The Supreme Court has spoken in very broad terms about the
limitations placed on government action by the First Amendment.
The “First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”235
“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”236 Courts
“further agree that the state should neither be able to select a
preferred religion (or religions) nor provide financial or political aid
to some religions while excluding others.”237 Sometimes the
language used can add unnecessary angst: that the Constitution
protects “nonreligion,” Arlin Adams and Charles Emmerich

233. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to DeWitt Clinton, supra note 37.
234. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989).
235. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citing Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
236. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
237. Gunn, supra note 41, at 18–19.
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explain, can “more properly [be] understood as connoting the right
of an individual to believe or not to believe in religious matters.”238
Within these broad parameters, the question of coercion has
become increasingly a topic of argument among commentators and
before the courts.239 Of course, the most immediate question is
what is meant by coercion in this context. Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Gorsuch have argued that what is required for an
establishment clause violation is an active government penalty
(financial or corporal) or benefit given to religion.240
The breadth of the Scalia/Thomas/Gorsuch argument is
breathtaking. If an actual fine or penalty is required, Congress
could declare the United States a Christian nation (or Muslim or
Jewish or Buddhist), as could states or localities. A large cross (or
Jewish star or Muslim star and crescent) could be erected on the
top of the White House, Congress, and other government
buildings¾a result that, thankfully, the majority of the Court

238. ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES
70 (1990).
239. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 936–41 (1986); Michael W. McConnell,
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part 1: Establishment of
Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131–81 (2003).
240. See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2096
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the founding, ‘[t]he coercion that was a
hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.’” (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
removed))); see also Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2263–
64 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (same). Thomas and Gorsuch also question
the application of the anti-establishment clause to the states based upon a too
narrow view of incorporation. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 170–80. Their
broad attack on the principle of separation of church and state in Espinoza is
based in large part on the argument that many people who supported separation did so based upon anti-Catholic animus in the mid-nineteenth century.
See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2266. While it is true that there was anti-Catholic
animus at work in church-state issues in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Thomas (and now Gorsuch) continue to ignore the fact that the American
principle of separation long predated the circumstances they cite and was not
based upon such animus. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 165–67. Eighteenthcentury evangelical Baptists and Presbyterians, for example, demanded a
strict separation of church and state, as did Thomas Jefferson and James Madison and their supporters, based upon philosophical, political, and theological
reasons having nothing to do with anti-Catholic animus. See supra Part II.
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continues expressly to eschew.241 The president could issue formal
executive orders and declarations urging everyone to attend a
particular church, to make a particular prayer, or to support one
particular religion. It would not even be clear that government
financing of religion would be actionable under this view, as it is
not clear that the taxpayer-plaintiff would have faced, in their
narrow interpretation, “coercion.”
Of course, it is true, as these justices point out, that such
positive coercion would have been considered an establishment in
the early American nation. And, as Lupu and Tuttle explained,
“[t]he founding generation was highly aware of the horrendous
history of religious coercion, so it’s hardly a surprise that the
Founders were primarily concerned with eliminating that
coercion.”242 But the fact that financial and penal coercion in the
context of religion is impermissible does not excuse other actions.
Such active, explicit coercion is a sufficient, but not a necessary
condition. The early understanding of establishment was not so
limited.
The most telling Jeffersonian discussion on this point is the
1808 letter from Jefferson to the Reverend Samuel Miller quoted at
length above.243 Jefferson expressly rejects the idea that for a
government edict to violate the Establishment Clause the
government must impose “some penalty on those who disregard it
. . . of fine [and] imprisonment.”244 Rather, Jefferson recognizes
that the First Amendment is intended to prevent the government
from “taking sides” in matters of religion.245 Thus, a proclamation
241. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2106 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[I]f Justice GORSUCH is right, three Members of the Court were out of line when they
recognized that ‘[t]he [Establishment] Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall.’” (citing Salazar
v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715 (2010)). See generally County of Allegeny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 606–07 (1989).
242. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 142. Lupu and Tuttle also provide
an excellent discussion of the apparent contradictions in the four-justice dissent in County of Allegheny that rejected the relevance of the fact that government action made some citizens feel like outsiders while agreeing that a county
could not erect a large cross on the top of a government building. See id. at
150–51.
243. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, supra note 161; see
supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
244. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, supra note 161.
245. Id.
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favoring religion wholly lacking in material penalty could still
violate the Constitution by imposing “some degree of proscription
perhaps in public opinion.”246 Jefferson concludes that such
stigmatization resulting from a government edict does not “make
the recommendation the less a law of conduct for those to whom it
is directed.”247 In other words, if the government action divides the
people by effectively taking a position that those who support some
religion, or prayer, or religious observance, or religion generally,
are superior, more patriotic, better citizens, it has violated the
Constitution’s proscription. In essence, Jefferson was saying that
any “coercion” need be only psychological; it exists when the

246. Id.
247. See id. This concern with encouraging division among the American
people along religious lines has long been a part of First Amendment jurisprudence. Justices across the spectrum of the Court made this point in American
Legion. Gorsuch and Thomas referred to “religiously based divisiveness that
the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.” Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n,
139 S. Ct. 2067, 2103 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)). Justices Ginsburg
and Sotomayor discussed the point at length:
When the government places its “power, prestige [or] financial support . . . behind a particular religious belief,’ the government’s imprimatur ‘mak[es] adherence to [that] religion relevant . . . to a person’s
standing in the political community’ . . . . [T]he indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially
approved religion is plain.
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2105 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989)). The Establishment Clause is
meant to ensure that “however . . . individuals worship, they will count as full
and equal American citizens.” Id. at 2113 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway,
572 U.S. 565, 615 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting)). Justice O’Connor referred to
the danger when government acts on religion so that a minority is made to feel
like “outsiders, not full members of the political community.” County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). As Justice
O’Connor explained:
At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences of
the assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may
count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional boundaries
has protected us from similar travails, while allowing private religious
exercise to flourish. . . . Those who would renegotiate the boundaries
between church and state must therefore answer a difficult question:
Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for one that
has served others so poorly?
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 246.
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government backs a particular religion or religion generally (or
irreligion).248
In Madison’s Detached Memoranda, in rejecting prayer
proclamations in spite of the claim that they were materially noncoercive, he emphasized that “An advisory Gov[ernmen]t is a
contradiction in terms.”249 Later, in seeking to explain his own
proclamations made under pressure, Madison used language that
seemed more equivocal on this point. In writing to Edward
Livingston in 1822, the former president began by again
denouncing
legislative
chaplains
and
national
prayer
proclamations, but qualified the latter with “so far at least as they
have spoken the language of injunction, or have lost sight of the
equality of all Religious Sects in the eye of the Constitution.”250
Madison continued:
Whilst I was honored with the Executive Trust, I found it
necessary on more than one occasion to follow the example
of predecessors. But I was always careful to make the
Proclamations absolutely indiscriminate, and merely
recommendatory; or rather mere designations of a day, on
which all who thought proper might unite in consecrating
it to religious purposes, according to their own faith &
forms. In this sense, I presume, you reserve to the
Government a right to appoint particular days for religious
worship throughout the State; without any particular
sanction enforcing the worship.251
Several years earlier, however, while noting that proclamations
were “recommendations only,” he still insisted that they were
beyond the authority of the government:
Religious proclamations by the Executive recommending
thanksgivings [and] fasts are shoots from the same root
with the legislative acts [chaplains] reviewed.

248. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, supra note 161.
249. See Detached Memoranda, supra note 179 (emphasis original).
250. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 163 (emphasis original).
251. Id. (emphasis original).
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Altho[ugh] recommendations only, they imply a religious
agency, making no part of the trust delegated to political
rulers.
The objections to them are . . . that Gov[ernmen]ts ought
not to interpose in relation to those subject to their authority
but in cases where they can do it with effect. An advisory
Gov[ernmen]t is a contradiction in terms . . . . The
members of a Gov[ernmen]t as such can in no sense, be
regarded as possessing an advisory trust from their
Constituents in their religious capacities . . . . They see{m}
{to} imply and certainly nourish the erronious [sic] idea of
a national religion. Th{is} idea just as it related to the
Jewish nation under a theocracy, having been improperly
a{d}opted by so many nations which have embraced
[Christia]nity, is too apt to lurk {in?} the bosoms even of
Americans, who in general are aware of the disti{nction}
between religious & political societies . . . . [T]he last & not
the least Objection is the liability of the practice, to
subserviency to political views; to the scandal of religion,
as well as the increase of party animosities.252
Overall, Madison’s view seems to parallel closely Jefferson’s
conclusion that any requisite coercion need only be implicit, the
impact of government “choosing” a religion or religion generally.253
Significantly, the eighteenth-century evangelicals who played
a critical role in the adoption of a Jeffersonian separation also
recognized that even a government endorsement was unfairly
coercive of the personal free will belief that God desired. John
Leland, the great Baptist preacher, explained that receiving
government “indulgence, preferment, or even protection” was a
form of idolatry by acknowledging a power not of the church.254
Using language not unlike Jefferson’s later admonition, Leland
made clear that government lacked the power to discourage a
person based on religious belief. “[N]or do the legitimate powers of
civil government extend so far as to disable, incapacitate, proscribe,
or in any way distress in person, property, liberty or life, any man

252. See Detached Memoranda, supra note 179 (emphasis original).
253. See Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 163.
254. LELAND, supra note 22, at 106 n*.
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who cannot believe and practice in the common road.”255 Baptists
from Buckingham County opposed even legislative incorporation of
churches, insisting that government needed simply to leave religion
alone as “the only way to convince the gazing world, that Disciples
do not follow Christ for Loaves, and that Preachers do not preach
for Benefices.”256 Government endorsement was neither sought nor
appropriate, a broad group of religionists from Amherst County
wrote in 1779, noting that they were “Fully Persuaded . . . . That
the Religion of [Jesus Christ] may and ought to be Committed to
the Protection Guidance and Blessing of its Divine Author and
needs not the Interposition of any Human Power for its
Establishment [and] Support.”257
When the government uses its authority to suggest that good
and patriotic Americans should endorse a particular religious view
or event, from a Jeffersonian perspective, and with a goal of
minimizing religious conflict, this is enough coercion to doom the
action constitutionally. This is not unlike the prohibition on
members of the military wearing uniforms to political rallies, giving
the erroneous, but implicitly coercive, impression that the military
has endorsed a particular political candidate.
Other scholars have made similar observations noting the
implicit penalty of not conforming to a government “choice” in this
area. For example, discussing the Continental Congress’ uses of
days of fasting and prayer during the Revolution, Derek Davis notes
“[t]hose who failed to observe the fasts were frowned upon by the
faithful and often suspected of disloyalty to American interests.”258
While it was argued in American Humanist that there was no
evidence that over the 100 years the Bladensburg Cross was
standing that minorities had been discouraged from objecting
because of the apparent government endorsement,259 this tends to

255. Id. at 108.
256. H. J. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA 119
(1910) (quoting Petition from the Inhabitants of Buckingham County to the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 1, 1786)).
257. Petition from the Inhabitants of Amherst County to the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 1, 1779), http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions [perma.cc/7SKZ-M29V].
258. Davis, supra note 100, at 186.
259. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2091 (2019)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that “nothing in the record suggests that the
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ignore the nature of such implicit coercion. It is also likely to
encourage future litigants to look for such evidence and present it
in the form of a “Brandeis brief,” further entangling the courts in
unnecessary and disruptive factual inquiries concerning religion
and implicit coercion.260
More recently, the Court gave important guidance on the issue
of religious coercion in the context of exempting religious
organizations from employment regulation. In Our Lady of
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the Court noted that the
First Amendment protects the right of religious organizations to
decide matters of faith and that “[s]tate interference in that sphere
would obviously violate the free exercise of religion, and any
attempt by government to dictate or even to influence such matters
would constitute one of the central attributes of an establishment
of religion.”261 In this Free Exercise context, the Court rejected any
government attempt “even to influence” such matters.262 This is an
excellent statement of the Jeffersonian principle and certainly any
effort by the government to endorse religion would be an attempt
“to influence” such matters and should properly be understood as
inconsistent with the First Amendment. A financial or physical
penalty is not required in spite of Justices Thomas, Scalia, and
Gorsuch’s efforts to breach the wall of separation.
Significantly, the Court has been particularly solicitous of any
coercive force imposed on children, particularly in the context of
schools. For example, in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy
lack of public outcry ‘was due to a climate of intimidation.’” (quoting Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment))).
260. See John Ragosta, Paul Finkelman & Steven K. Green, Town prayers:
What does the Supreme Court mean by ‘coercion’? WASH. POST (May 6, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/commentary-town-prayers-what-does-the-supreme-court-mean-by-coercion/2014/05/06/0ec41abad55c-11e3-8f7d-7786660fff7c_story.html [https://perma.cc/H6TH-RGED].
261. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060
(2020); compare County of Alleghany v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“plac[ing] the government’s weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion” violates the Establishment
Clause), with Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2256 (2020)
(“The Free Exercise Clause protects against even ‘indirect coercion,’ and a
State ‘punishe[s] the free exercise of religion’ by disqualifying the religious
from government aid as Montana did here.” (quoting Trinity Lutheran Church
of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2017) (alteration original))).
262. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2060.
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recognized the problem: “The sole question presented is whether a
religious exercise may be conducted at a graduation ceremony in
circumstances where, as we have found, young graduates who
object are induced to conform.”263 While it is appropriate for the
Court to be particularly concerned with coercion of minors¾as was
Jefferson, for example in his argument that Bibles should not be
used in the schooling of young children264¾the same concerns, at
least in principle, apply to all citizens. If the “material coercion”
test was adopted, it would seriously undermine the argument for a
more solicitous protection of children in the Court’s jurisprudence.
It is worth discussing an alternative approach to the First
Amendment religion clauses that, to some extent, avoids questions
of coercion. In Secular Government, Religious People, Lupu and
Tuttle suggest that the focus should be on government rather than
individuals who might (or might not) be coerced; after all, the First
Amendment is fundamentally a restriction on government
power.265 This was certainly a point made in the early debates over
separation. John Leland explained that “[g]overnment has no more
to do with the religious opinions of men, than it has with the

263. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). The Court has distinguished government sponsored prayer for adults (although the Court’s flippant
conclusion that adults are “not readily susceptible . . . to peer pressure” is
highly suspect):
This case can be distinguished from the conclusions and holding of Lee
v. Weisman . . . . There the Court found that, in the context of a graduation where school authorities maintained close supervision over the
conduct of the students and the substance of the ceremony, a religious
invocation was coercive as to an objecting student. . . . Neither choice
represents an unconstitutional imposition as to mature adults who
“presumably” are “not readily susceptible to religious indoctrination,
or peer pressure.”
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014) (citations omitted) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)); cf. Doe v. Indian River Sch.
Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 264–65, 276 (3d Cir. 2011) (Students at school board meetings for presentations “bear several markings of ‘involuntariness’ and the implied coercion that the Court has acknowledged elsewhere.”).
264. See JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 147 (“Instead therefore of putting the
Bible and Testament into the hands of the children, at an age when their judgments are not sufficiently matured for religious enquiries, their memories may
here be stored with the most useful facts from Grecian, Roman, European and
American history.”).
265. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 5.
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principles of mathematics.”266 Jefferson was equally clear that one
should not give government “an authority over religious exercises
which the constitution has directly precluded them from.”267
Lupu and Tuttle give Engel v. Vitale as an example of the
application of their method, arguing that while the lower New York
court had found no coercion in the prayer, the Supreme Court
instead focused on the government being engaged in the
impermissible function of writing a prayer.268 The Court stated
emphatically that “it is no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.”269
Yet, the Court went on to explain the problem generated by that
type of government activity:
The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to
stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the
prestige of the Federal Government would be used to
control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the
American people can say— that the people’s religions must
not be subjected to the pressures of government for change
each time a new political administration is elected to office
....
. . . The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise
Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct
governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment
of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or
not . . . . When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief,
the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain.270
266. LELAND, supra note 86, at 184.
267. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, supra note 161.
268. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 119–20.
269. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
270. Id. at 429–31 (emphasis added). The mere posting of Ten Commandments in schools would not meet the coercion test (as argued by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Gorsuch), but be violative under jurisdiction test. See LUPU &
TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 126.
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Two thoughts: First, one of the reasons why government was
precluded from acting or talking on these topics is that government
speech is almost always inherently coercive; even if our legal
analysis should focus more on government action rather than the
impact on individuals, certainly it is true that we do not want (and
the First Amendment should be seen to prohibit) government
coercion in the area of religion.
Second, some might distinguish in this context government
action that solicits a response from that which does not. So, for
example, it could be argued that a government proclamation of a
national day of prayer might be seen as inherently coercive whereas
maintenance of a religious symbol previously placed on public
ground might not. This is a potentially useful distinction, but one
significant problem in the cases dealing with public religious
monuments is failure to consider adequately the active expenditure
of funds to maintain the monuments.271
D. Religious Exemptions
Since the founding of the United States, people have sought to
have their otherwise illegal activities excused based upon an
alleged religious justification. Since adoption of the poorly named
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993,272 people are
increasingly claiming that their religious freedom gives them a
right to ignore laws with which they do not agree. The idea seeming
to be that on the “private side” of the wall of separation, religion is
a license. Such claims range, for example, from a commercial
bakery’s refusal to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple,273 to

271. This issue has been much discussed in the context of Confederate monuments. See, e.g., Brian Palmer & Seth Freed Wessler, The Costs of the Confederacy, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Dec. 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/costs-confederacy-special-report-180970731/
[perma.cc/9Z5U-TMVR]; Steven I. Weiss, You Won’t Believe What the Government Spends on Confederate Graves, ATLANTIC (July 19, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/07/government-spendingconfederate-graves/277931/ [https://perma.cc/27CK-3266] (funding, per se,
might not be found to make a monument an illegal establishment if “neutral”
funding is applied to existing monuments, but it does increase the problem
with the maintenance of religious iconography).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
273. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1723 (2018).
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refusal to rent a wedding space to an inter-racial couple,274 to
refusal to provide contraceptive coverage in employee health
insurance,275 to refusal to abide by sexual-orientation nondiscrimination in foster care.276
Cases of this type are myriad and excessively complicated
because of RFRA. I will not seek to survey the ground on religious
exemptions here but, rather, will seek to make several historic
observations. Jefferson expressly rejected such exemptions from
“impartial” laws:
[W]hatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth, or permitted
to the subject in the ordinary way, cannot be forbidden to
him for religious uses; [and] whatsoever is prejudicial to
the commonwealth in their ordinary uses & therefore
prohibited by the laws, ought not to be permitted to
churches in their sacred rites. [F]or instance it is unlawful
in the ordinary course of things or in a private house to
murder a child. [I]t should not be permitted any sect then
to sacrifice children: it is ordinarily lawful (or temporally
lawful) to kill calves or lambs. [T]hey may therefore be
religiously sacrificed, but if the good of the state required a
temporary suspension of killing lambs (as during a siege)
sacrifices of them may then be rightfully suspended also.
[T]his is the true extent of toleration.277
Jefferson made this point again in the preamble to the Statute for
Establishing Religious Freedom: While “the opinions of men are not
the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction,”
government can intervene when religious “principles break out into
overt acts against peace and good order.”278 He repeated the point
in discussions with Madison about a possible Bill of Rights: “[t]he

274. Allyson Chiu, A Mississippi wedding venue rejected an interracial couple, citing ‘Christian belief.’ Facing a backlash, the owner apologized., WASH.
POST (Sept. 3, 2019, 7:04 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/
2019/09/03/mississippi-wedding-venue-rejects-interracial-couple-christian-belief-apologized/ [https://perma.cc/XTE2-DLFJ].
275. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
276. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F. 3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (19-123).
277. Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, supra note 92.
278. Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60.
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declaration that religious faith shall be unpunished, does not give
impunity to criminal acts dictated by religious error.”279
Madison joined in the argument. Madison wrote to Edward
Livingston that he approved of “the immunity of Religion from Civil
Jurisdiction, in every case where it does not trespass on private
rights or the public peace.”280 Thomas Cooley, the nineteenth
century constitutional scholar, agreed: Religious practice is exempt
from government intrusion “so long as the public order is not
disturbed.”281 Eighteenth-century evangelicals agreed: “Should a
man refuse to pay his tribute for the support of government, or any
wise disturb the peace and good order of the civil police, he should
be punished according to his crime, let his religion be what it will;
but when a man is a peaceable subject of state, he should be
protected in worshipping the Deity according to the dictates of his
own conscience.”282
Of course, laws always addressed
circumstances (such as commercial discrimination) when actions
tread on “the public peace.”
The Supreme Court’s first religious freedom case also
emphatically rejected the doctrine of a religious exemption: “To
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only
in name under such circumstances.”283 Modern cases, after some
hesitation, agreed.284
The scope of this Jeffersonian approach is not so broad as some
suggest nor is it an attack on religion. First, legislation determines
279. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0335
[perma.cc/77FS-WGFN] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
280. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 163.
281. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
467 (2d ed. 1871).
282. JOHN LELAND, A YANKEE SPY (1794), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF
ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra note 22, at 213, 228.
283. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). When confronted
with the question of religious-based polygamy, the Court recognized that
“[h]owever free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the
criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation.” Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1890).
284. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–82 (1990) (rejecting religious exemptions for “neutral, generally applicable regulatory laws”).
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what is a violation of the public order (“peace and good order” to use
Jefferson’s term).285 Business owners can discriminate on the basis
of race, sexual orientation, religion, gender, or any other criteria
until the duly-elected legislature prohibits such discrimination.
The law itself must fall within the legitimate authority of
government and must not, itself, violate constitutional
proscriptions. To use a term that Jefferson used, it must be
“impartial regulation” (or what the Court today would say is
“neutral”).286 Picking up on Jefferson’s example: If the government,
in time of war, prohibits the slaughtering of lambs so as to
encourage meat production of sheep, this is a legitimate
government regulation, and one cannot claim a religious

285. See Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60.
286. Jefferson authored the Rockfish Gap Commissioners’ Report that,
when adopted by the Virginia House of Delegates, created the University of
Virginia. See Ellen Hickman, Avoiding “The appearance of dictating to the Assembly”: Thomas Jefferson and the Establishment of the University of Virginia,
1818-1819, in THE FOUNDING OF THOMAS JEFFERSON’S UNIVERSITY 95, 95–101
(John A. Ragosta, et al. eds., 2019). Jefferson’s initial draft not only excluded
a professor of divinity, even though such a professorship was the practice at
other colleges, but it also did not provide for religious services on campus. See
Thomas Jefferson, Draft of the Rockfish Gap Report of the University of Virginia Commissioners, in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT
SERIES 189, 189–202 (J. Jefferson Looney, et al. eds., 2018). At the meeting of
the Rockfish Gap commissioners, presumably having been encouraged by other
commissioners, Jefferson added a clause that a room would be provided for
“religious worship, under such impartial regulations as the Visitors shall prescribe, for public examinations, for a library.” See id. at 203 n.22. Jefferson
and the UVA Board of Visitors later reaffirmed their commitment to impartiality. Meeting Minutes of Univ. of Va. Board of Visitors (October 2, 1820),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-021551 [perma.cc/RYP3-ENTD] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). Jefferson later returned to the need for impartial regulation in an 1825 letter to the University’s
proctor, Arthur Brockenbrough. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Arthur S.
Brockenbrough (April 21, 1825), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.
gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-5152 [perma.cc/3TLS-NM6Z] (last visited
Feb. 19, 2021). While Jefferson ultimately refused to permit religious services
on UVA’s campus during his life, see RAGOSTA supra note 1, at 193–98, the
standard that he proposed is much like the modern Court’s use of “neutrality”
between religion and non-religion, cf. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140
S. Ct. 2246, 2280 (2020) (“The Free Exercise Clause . . . ‘protects religious observers against unequal treatment’ and against ‘laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status.’” (quoting Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted))).
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exemption.287 At the same time, the government could not ban
Jewish people from slaughtering lambs or ban the slaughtering of
lambs for religious purposes as those would not be “impartial
regulations.”288 One must be vigilant that laws are neutral before
any question of religious exemption arises. The question in the first
instance is not whether such laws are a good idea or should survive,
but who should be responsible for crafting such laws and
limitations.289
Second, the legislature can create an exception or exemption to
its own laws that impose requirements that might impinge on
individual’s religious exercises. For example, a ban on the use of
alcohol might exempt sacramental wine, as the law did during
Prohibition. Similarly, a law criminalizing the use of peyote might
readily include an exemption for Native American religious
practices. Such exceptions can accommodate, but not endorse,
religion. The Court has said that such accommodation evidences
“play in the joints” between the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses.290 As Lupu and Tuttle explain:
Whenever the government responds to religious needs as
part of a broader class of concerns, the government does not
make those religious needs a matter of its own ends or
identity. Instead, it recognizes that many of its people will
make those concerns a central part of their own life
projects.291
As with the legislative proscriptions at issue, such exemptions
should come from the legislature.292
287. See Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, supra note 92; supra note 277 and
accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 521 (1993).
289. Justice Scalia, who authored the opinion in Smith, was in part making
this point. See Smith, 494 U.S. 872. Compare Justice Kavanaugh’s plaintive
plea in American Legion that the courts are not the only protectors of religious
freedom. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2092–94 (2019).
290. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019.
291. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 215.
292. The Supreme Court’s most recent cases, however, draw into question
this “play in the joints” between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise clause, seeming to require states to always treat religious institutions the
same as secular institutions. Cf. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S.
Ct. 2246, 2282 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had previously “held that there ‘are some state actions permitted by the Establishment
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Most of the modern cases, however, raise questions under a
blanket exception or qualification, as in RFRA. Such laws raise
broad concerns, in particular unintended consequences. Keep in
mind that a court cannot question an individual’s claim of religious
need, for example, the insistence that a baker’s religion prohibits
her or him from baking a cake is tenuous and would be strongly
challenged by many theologians, but it is not a court’s responsibility
to do so.293
Thus, any individual can object to application of any law based
upon their own personal religious beliefs and force the government,
if it wishes to enforce the law, to show that the law either does not
substantially burden that person’s religion (as they define it) or
serves a compelling government interest and is crafted as narrowly
as possible to not infringe on a person’s religious exercise. As
Jefferson recognized, the broad and undefined application of these
exemptions is a prescription for disaster.294 In a “liberal” example,
people providing relief to undocumented immigrants have
successfully relied upon RFRA.295 Those supporting polygamy can
be expected to make similar arguments. One labor lawyer has
confided to me his intention to use RFRA to argue that restrictions
on labor organizing violate his Marxist religion.
Under RFRA, not only will many practices have to be permitted
when justified based upon an alleged religious reason, potentially
creating a patchwork of legal enforcement and limiting the
solicitous effects of good laws, but an immense amount of court time
Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.’” (quoting Locke v. Davey,
540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004))). While the Court’s decision in Espinoza benefitted
religious education, the same rationale might be used to claim that any legislative religious exemption is, de facto, an establishment.
293. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714–15 (1981) (“[I]t is
not for [courts] to say that the line dr[awn]” on a religious belief is “an unreasonable one.” (citation omitted)); see also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 200
(“[T]he long-standing constraint on judicial evaluation of ‘the place of a particular belief in a religion’ has remained fully intact.” (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989))). Cf. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter
and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2365, 2390–91 (2020) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (although RFRA requires an “honest conviction,” “it is not for
[courts] to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial” (citations omitted)).
294. See Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60.
295. See Elana Schor, Religious freedom law plays key role in migrant-aid
case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 29, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/
1c894dedcb744e4f82ad925dbbc8042f [https://perma.cc/W4WM-JZ5E].
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will be taken up by issues more properly resolved by a legislature
or administrative agency. This type of blanket exception turns
decisions that should be made by legislatures over to courts.296
Moreover, with the plethora of cases justifying violations of
anti-discrimination laws based on religion, the courts will certainly
face renewed arguments that racial and religious discrimination is
required by some bigoted plaintiffs’ religion.297 While we can
anticipate that the courts will find ending racial discrimination a
compelling state interest, we can expect a host of litigation on
whether legislation intended to end racial discrimination is
adequately narrowly tailored. Similar arguments will arise in cases
involving discrimination against Jews, Mormons, Muslims, and
other religious minorities. Discrimination based on gender, genderorientation, age, national origin, etc., will likely face similar tests.
CONCLUSION

A fundamental point, worth repeating, is that a strict
separation of church and state, in a Jeffersonian voice, is not
inconsistent with a vibrant private religion on the “other” side of
the wall. Indeed, history demonstrates that it encourages it.
Nor does a separation undermine the morality and virtue of
government or its citizens. Nor do government officials have to
“check” their religiosity at the door of government service, although
they are precluded from using their government position to promote
religion.
A renewed commitment to a Jeffersonian separation of church
and state would result in citizens, courts, and legislatures
recognizing that government efforts to influence religion, even to

296. See John Ragosta, We can celebrate religious freedom by keeping religion separate from government, DALL. MORNING NEWS, (Jan. 16, 2020, 2:00
AM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/01/16/we-cancelebrate-religious-freedom-by-keeping-religion-separate-from-government/
[https://perma.cc/5F7X-CN7V]. In addition, judicial activism on Free Exercise
is a strange position to be championed by conservatives who claim to favor judicial restraint.
297. For example, a new, “whites only” church has opened in Minnesota,
the Asatru Folk Assembly. John Reinan, Minnesota town votes to allow white
supremacist church, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.startribune.
com/tiny-minnesota-town-to-vote-today-on-allowing-white-supremacistchurch/573344361/ [https://perma.cc/Q3AE-V6RD]. Claims of a religious basis
for racial discrimination will almost certainly proliferate under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act due to the recent trends in Supreme Court cases.
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encourage it generally, serve only to tarnish it, corrupt government,
and recklessly divide the American people.

